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The purpose of this thesis is to firstly analyze the determinants on the survival of 
United States Marine Corps Officers, and secondly, to develop the methodology to 
optimize the accessions of prior and non-prior enlisted officers. Using data from the 
Marine Corps Officer Accession Career file (MCCOAC), the Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model is used to estimate the effects of officer characteristics on their survival as a 
commissioned officer in the USMC. A Markov model for career transition is combined 
with fiscal data to determine the optimum number of prior and non-prior enlisted officers 
under the constraints of force structure and budget. 
The findings indicate that prior enlisted officers have a better survival rate than 
their non-prior enlisted counterparts. Additionally, officers who are married, 
commissioned through MECEP, graduate in the top third of their TBS class, and are 
assigned to a combat support MOS have a better survival rate than officers who are 
unmarried, commissioned through USNA, graduate in the middle third of their TBS 
class, and are assigned to either combat or combat service support MOS. The findings 
also indicate that the optimum number of prior enlisted officer accessions may be 
considerably lower than recent trends and may differ across MOS. Based on the findings, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Every year since 1980, in excess of 1,000 Marines Corps Officers (and 
occasionally over 1,600) have graduated from The Basic School which almost all United 
Stated Marine Corps officers attend before they receive their commission. Many of these 
graduates have been prior enlisted personnel who, after passing the prescribed selection 
criteria, have decided to continue their careers as officers in the Marine Corps.  
A comparison of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers may aid in 
determining the most effective method for obtaining and retaining officers. It is intuitive 
that the longer a high-performing officer remains in the Marine Corps, the greater the 
benefit to the service, as it requires money, experience and other resources to recruit and 
train replacements. It therefore follows that if one group were to exhibit greater attributes 
of retention and promotion, on average, than the other, then consideration should be 
given to increasing the accession of officers from this group. 
Any decision to favor one group over another based only on retention and 
performance would, however, not give due consideration to the cost of each group of 
officers. A conflict exists where the group which has the highest levels of retention is also 
the most expensive to recruit and train. In reality there is both a budget for officer 
accessions, and a prescribed number of officers required at each rank to maintain the 
force structure. 
1. Commissioning Sources and Cost Benefits 
Although the topic of the retention of prior and non-prior enlisted Marine Corps 
officers has been explored previously, much of the prior research has examined only the 
effects of the commissioning source on the likelihood that an officer will be retained until 
a particular career milestone. However, although some commissioning sources are 
exclusive to prior enlisted officers, generalizations about the behavior of prior enlisted 
officers cannot be made based on the commissioning source alone because several 






The two commissioning sources exclusive to prior enlisted officers are Marine 
Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP) and Enlisted Commissioning 
Program (ECP). Additionally, enlisted personnel may be commissioned through a third 
source, the Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP). The remaining commissioning 
sources, including the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC), Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) and Officer Candidate Course 
(OCC), graduate both prior and non-prior enlisted officer candidates, albeit in varying 
proportions.  
The media and Congress occasionally focus on the cost of maintaining so many 
commissioning sources. Skeptics of the cost of officer commissioning sources for the 
Navy point to the average cost per officer accession from USNA exceeding $229,000 as 
evidence that there must be a better alternative.1 Other evidence suggests that USNA 
graduates have lower attrition and comparable marginal costs resulting in the USNA 
actually being more cost-effective for Navy officer accessions than other commissioning 
sources.2  
The cost-effectiveness debate for the USMC is further complicated in comparison 
to the Navy by its large number of commissioning sources and the relatively high 
proportion of officers who come through the ranks (prior enlisted), compared with other 
services. Deciding on the most cost effective distribution of officers across the seven 
commissioning sources therefore poses a multidimensional problem.  
Neither prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted officers can alone provide enough 
officers to sustain the Marine Corps. However, it is possible that one group may be more 
successful in its commissioned careers and more ‘beneficial’ to the USMC in terms of 
performance and retention than the other group. An analysis to determine which group of 
officers, the prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted, currently remain in the USMC for longer 
terms could provide some insight as to which group should be targeted for 
                                                 
1 Bernard and Mehay, An Analysis of Alternate Commissioning Programs for Navy Officers 
(Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 4. 
2 Ibid., table 1. Also see Bowman, W.R. Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies:New Evidence from 






commissioning. Maximizing The Basic School (TBS) intake of the higher retention group 
could have long-term benefits for the USMC. This benefit, however, would need to be 
balanced by the cost of each commissioning program. 
 
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. The first research area concerns identifying 
the effect that being prior enlisted has on officer longevity. The second research area 
attempts to identify an optimal mix of prior and non-prior enlisted officers in the USMC 
with respect to a given set of constraints, which may be varied according to pre-specified 
conditions thereby providing a sensitivity analysis. 
Specifically, the research focuses on answering the following questions: 
• What effect does being a prior enlisted Marine have on officer longevity, 
ceteris paribus? 
• What is the optimal mix of prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions 
such that the force structure can be maintained without resulting in 
vacancies at various ranks and without exceeding the fiscal budget? 
 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis examines the careers of prior enlisted United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) officers with respect to their completed years of commissioned service (YCS) 
by analyzing officer cohorts from 1986 to 1999 inclusive. Prior-enlisted officers are 
defined as those officers who have held any enlisted rank from E-1 to E-9 prior to 
commissioning through TBS.  
The necessary number of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted accessions required 
to maintain the officer force structure will also be examined. The force structure is 
defined numerically as the number of officers required in each rank as determined by 







D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter II develops basic background 
information on the seven commissioning sources. The literature review, Chapter III, 
identifies other sources of information regarding the commissioning sources, officer 
accession, officer retention, and promotion. It also discusses some of the findings and 
methodology of related studies. 
The remainder of the study is broken into two areas of research. Chapters IV and 
V provide the methodology and results for the semi-parametric analysis of the data, while 
Chapters VI and VII provide the methodology and results for the non-parametric 
analysis. The final chapter, Chapter VIII, summarizes the findings and provides 
recommendations resulting from the study along with suggestions for future research.  
 
E. LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Most studies into the effects of commissioning source on promotion and retention 
have used logit or probit models with a binary dependent variable. The dependent 
variable has usually been a milestone such as whether an individual was promoted to a 
particular rank, or retained to a specific mark, say ten years of service.  
Observation of whether an individual exceeds the retention milestone by one day 
or several years is unimportant in logit models. Hence, although logit models are useful 
in identifying important factors for achievement of the milestone, the results are not 
necessarily useful in determining those characteristics affecting the survival of 
individuals over a period of time. This is because the logit model oversimplifies the 
survival of individuals as either having made ten years or not, whereas, in reality, 
individuals are likely to have survived over the spectrum of possibilities from one day to 
over 30 years of commissioned service. There are alternatives to using logit models in the 
analysis of survival data and two of these alternative methodologies are the focus of this 






1. Semi-parametric Studies 
The Cox Regression Model, sometimes referred to as an example of a semi-
parametric model, has become one of the most widely used methods for performing 
survival analysis. It has certain advantages over other regression methods; in particular, 
the coefficients combined with a ‘risk ratio’ have an interpretation without the need to 
calculate partial effects separately as is the case with a logit or probit model. Cox 
regression, which will be discussed briefly in Chapter IV, allows modeling of the actual 
likelihood of survival rather than the achievement of an arbitrary milestone. 
The advantages of semi-parametric analyses are similar to those of parametric 
analyses. Specifically, these methods allow an effect to be attributed to each variable. The 
magnitude and statistical significance can be determined; this enables the researcher to 
determine the factors that affect the observed outcome. Specific advantages of the Cox 
Regression Model are outlined in Chapter IV. 
Although parametric analysis is the preferred method of most researchers on 
account of its ability to determine partial effects, there are several disadvantages.  First, 
partial effects may be subject to bias where not all of the covariates have been identified 
or where data cannot be obtained for some variables. A second disadvantage is the 
requirement of data for the identified covariates. Although this is not always an issue, 
obtaining data can occasionally pose its own restrictions on the analysis. Finally, for the 
casual observer, some models, particularly those not using ordinary least squares, can be 
difficult to interpret without the aid of software. 
2. Non-parametric Studies 
Previous studies have generally discounted the use of non-parametric methods on 
the basis that the influence of factors on retention or promotion cannot be easily 
determined. However, such studies have normally had the express purpose of identifying 
the influence of factors on retention and promotion and not the survival of officers as a 
function of time only. If the area of interest is in the survival of officers and not the 
reasons for their survival, then non-parametric models may represent a viable alternative.  
A conclusion is often made in parametric analyses that factors shown to be 






exploited so that retention can be increased. This ignores the role that observations with 
lower levels of retention play in maintaining the required force structure. With all things 
remaining equal, including criteria for promotion selection, high levels of retention could 
result in a top-heavy force structure, pressure to raise promotion criteria, an increase in 
promotion-qualified personnel at lower ranks, inflated reporting, or forced attrition where 
the force structure cannot accommodate the increase in officer retention. The existence of 
observations with lower retention therefore permits the force to remain hierarchical 
whilst permitting attrition at lower ranks.   
Unlike parametric studies, non-parametric analyses place little emphasis on the 
partial effects of variables and instead examine the overall behavior of groups. 
Characteristics that either improve or worsen retention are largely ignored in preference 
for what has actually occurred in the past. In other words, while the parametric models 
examine the individual effects of variables and can attribute statistical significance to 
variables in explaining observed behavior, the non-parametric models are concerned with 
the observed behavior itself without regard for what actually made it occur. 
The main disadvantage of non-parametric models is that the effects of variables 
cannot easily be isolated and the impact of systematic trends in the data cannot easily be 
observed. As a result the researcher cannot answer questions regarding what caused or 
contributed to an observation. The advantages of the non-parametric models are largely 
in their simplicity and ability to be communicated. Additionally, these models require no 
assumptions of underlying distributions and do not require the acquisition of data for 
covariates. Further discussion of the disadvantages of non-parametric models is included 







II. MARINE CORPS COMMISSIONING SOURCES 
A. OVERVIEW 
There are seven commissioning sources for USMC officers. Each of these sources 
has different prerequisites including age, experience, and level of education, and they 
also differ in post-commissioning aspects such as service obligation. Regardless of the 
commissioning source, almost all officers are required to attend TBS immediately after 
commissioning.3 This chapter summarizes the literature regarding characteristics of the 
commissioning sources. Further detailed information including history of each source can 
be obtained in Finley (2002) or alternatively, O’Brien (2002). 
 
B. UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY 
Graduates from USNA who choose to become Marine Corps Officers represent a 
significant proportion of all officers. Traditionally, one sixth of USNA graduates are 
selected to become Marine Corps officers regardless of the size of the graduating class. 
After completion of a four-year baccalaureate degree program at USNA, graduates 
selected for the Marine Corps attend TBS for a period of 26 weeks. Column (b) in Table 
1 summarizes the USNA accession sequence. 
 
C. NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS 
NROTC also selects one sixth of graduates for service with the Marine Corps. 
Unlike USNA, Midshipmen selected to attend an NROTC unit do not attend a residential 
military academy; rather, they are awarded scholarships at civilian institutions and 
receive full tuition toward their degree. After completion of the third year of a four-year 
baccalaureate degree program, the potential Marine Corps officer is required to attend a 
six-week training period at Officer Candidates School (OCS). On completion of the 
                                                 







degree, the Marine Corps officer is required to attend TBS. Column (c) in Table 1 
summarizes the NROTC accession sequence. 
 
D. PLATOON LEADERS COURSE 
PLC provides the highest proportion of Marine Corps officers and is open to those 
who are studying for a degree through an accredited university. PLC candidates who 
enroll in the PLC program during their freshman year are required to attend two six-week 
OCS training periods. Candidates who enroll after the freshman year are required to 
attend a ten-week OCS training period. Column (d) in Table 1 summarizes the PLC 
accession sequence. 
 
E. OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE 
OCC traditionally provides the second highest proportion of Marine Corps 
officers and is open to those who have graduated or are in their senior year of study at an 
accredited university. OCC candidates are required to attend one ten-week OCS training 
period. Column (e) in Table 1 summarizes the OCC accession sequence. 
 
F. MARINE CORPS ENLISTED COMMISSIONING EDUCATION 
PROGRAM 
 
MECEP is intended to commission those enlisted Marines who have been 
identified as performing at an outstanding level. The MECEP program sponsors 
candidates for attendance on a full-time degree program while also receiving full pay and 
allowances. MECEP candidates are attached to NROTC units while they study for their 
degree and are required to attend a six-week training period at OCS. Column (f) in Table 







G. ENLISTED COMMISSIONING PROGRAM 
ECP provides an avenue through which qualified enlisted Marines can apply for  
OCS and subsequent attendance at TBS. Candidates applying for the ECP are required to 
possess a four year baccalaureate degree. Column (g) in table 1 summarizes the MECEP 
accession sequence. 
 
H. MERITORIOUS COMMISSIONING PROGRAM 
MCP provides the smallest number of officers of all commissioning sources. The 
program provides an avenue through which commanding officers can nominate highly 
qualified Marines for attendance at OCS and subsequent attendance at TBS. These 
officers are not initially required to posses a degree or to enroll in a program prior to 
commissioning; however, they are required to continue the pursuit of a degree. Column 
(h) in Table 1 summarizes the MECEP accession sequence. 
 
Table 1.   Summary of USMC Accession Sequence for Each Commissioning Source 
 
 USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Exclusive to 
Enlisted personnel 
    9 9 9 
Selected before 
degree commenced 
9 9   9   
Selected during 
freshman/sophmore 
  9     
Selected during 
junior year 
  9     
Degree obtained 
before selection 
   9  9  
Six-week OCS 
course 
 9   9   
2 x six-week OCS 
course 
  9     
Ten-week OCS 
course 
  94 9  9 9 
Attendance at 26-
week TBS 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Minimum service 
obligation 
5 years 3 1/2 
years 
3 years 3 years 4 years 3 years 3 years 
                                                 








As shown in Table 1, the commissioning sources differ significantly in the 
accession sequence. The impact of the differences between the sources on retention and 
promotion behavior has been explored in other studies, some of which are discussed in 
the Literature Review in Chapter III. The table does not indicate other inherent 
differences in the officers themselves. For example, the basic requirements of an USNA 
applicant include that he or she not be married, have no dependents, and not be older than 
23 years of age. Such restrictions are not applicable, or appropriate, to other 
commissioning sources including the exclusively enlisted commissioning sources 
MECEP, ECP and MCP. However, some non-USNA sources have other restrictions 
including attendance at universities, Grade Point Average prerequisites, different age 










III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The literature regarding retention of USMC personnel has been steadily growing 
since the development of relatively robust data files. More recently, several studies have 
been conducted using a data set that has been developed using all Marine Corps officers 
over the last two decades. Each study has had its own particular focus which varies 
slightly from the focus of this thesis. However, some of the findings have particular 
relevance in identifying potential factors which may be important in developing models 
for this thesis. The information provided in this chapter is intended as a brief overview of 
the methodologies and relevant findings in the literature. 
    
B. LITERATURE DISCUSSION 
1. Non-military Studies on Turnover Rates 
Literature regarding military retention and turnover is almost exclusively 
conducted by military agencies or agencies contracted to perform analyses on the behalf 
of the military. Turnover is, however, a more general topic and many insights pertaining 
to the military can be drawn from the numerous studies in areas outside the military.  
Examinations of factors that affect turnover in the civilian sector often arrive at 
similar conclusions. Cotton and Tuttle (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of 131 studies of 
turnover rates. The variables included in the meta-analysis consisted of three broad types: 
external variables, internal variables, and personal variables. The external variables 
included factors such as unemployment rates, vacancy rates, and organizational size. The 
internal variables included measures of performance, pay, and job satisfaction. Personal 
variables included age, gender, education, marital status, and ‘biographical’ information. 
The meta-analysis found that almost all variables were significant to some extent. 
Relevant to this thesis, the meta analysis found that age, tenure, education, number of 
dependents and ‘biographical’ information were all highly significant (p-value <0.01). 






related to turnover. Gender was also significant (p-value <0.01) and was found to have a 
positive effect on turnover, that is, females are more likely to leave than men. Marital 
status was also found to be significant (p-value <0.01) with married people being less 
likely to leave than singles. 
Several of the findings of Cotton and Tuttle are well documented and accepted in 
the analysis of turnover and in labor economics. For example, it is widely recognized that 
women have higher rates of turnover than men.5 It is also argued that the quality of job 
matches rise as the age of the employee increases, hence the older an employee, the lower 
the turnover rate.6 
The significance of many other variables is also well documented. Worker 
mobility is known to be affected by wage differentials whereby an employee is more 
likely to move from a low-paying job to a high paying job, all else equal.7 Additionally, it 
has been observed that as the unemployment rate increases, worker mobility decreases, 
because people are less likely to enter a job market where there are relatively few jobs 
available for those seeking employment.8 
Studies indicate that the implications for the military of many of the factors 
discussed so far are similar to those for the civilian community, although the magnitude 
may differ. The impacts on the military of many of the economic factors are summarized 
by Warner and Asch (1995). It is found that high unemployment rates in the civilian 
sector have a significant positive affect on reenlistment rates, or lower first-term 
attrition.9  Whether this finding can be generalized to reenlistment decisions beyond the 
first term is uncertain. Warner and Asch also summarize findings that pay and bonuses 
are consistently found to have a positive effect on retention, or negative effect on 
attrition.10 Warner and Asch focused much of their research on the economics of military 
                                                 
5 Ehrenberg and Smith, Modern Labor Economics (Addison Wesley, 2002), 333-334. 
6 Ibid., 332. 
7 Ibid., 333. 
8 Ibid., 334. 
9 Warner and Asch, The Economics of Military Manpower (1995), 366. 
10 Ibid., 365-366. Pay and Bonuses are normally incorporated in an Annualized Cost of Leaving 






manpower, rather than the effects of individual characteristics on turnover per se. The 
following studies discussed in this Chapter examine the effects of many of the personal 
variables on attrition. 
2. Study by North and Smith (1993) 
North and Smith (1993) examined officer accession characteristics and success at 
OCS, success after commissioning, and success at The Basic School. Using ordinary least 
squares they produced two separate models for the class standing on graduation from 
TBS and attrition from OCS as a function of age, race, SAT score, college major, prior 
service, marital status, and commissioning source.  
The results of the study showed that the most significant factor positively 
affecting success at OCS was prior Marine enlisted experience. They also found minority 
status had a significant negative effect on success at TBS along with being female and 
graduating from OCC or PLC (NROTC was the base). Conversely, being married, having 
a science or technical college major, higher SAT score, and graduating from ECP or 
USNA (NROTC base) had a significant positive effect on TBS class rank.     
3. Study by Quester and Hiatt 
Quester and Hiatt (2001) conducted some simple diagnostic analysis of the results 
of the different entry sources on retention and attrition. The results are inconclusive; the 
five-year continuation percentages (i.e. the percentage of commissioned officers who are 
still in the USMC five years after commissioning) by commissioning source are detailed 
in Table 2.   
 
Table 2.   Five Year Continuation Rates by Commissioning Source 
 
Commissioning Source 5 year 
continuation 
Platoon Leader Course (PLC) 74.5% 
Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 67.2% 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC) 77.3% 
United States Naval Academy (NSNA) 91.4% 
Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MCECEP) 91.8% 







What this preliminary study doesn’t show is the relative sizes of the 
commissioning sources or the number of prior-enlisted officers who were commissioned 
through sources other than MECEP and ECP. Additionally, the payback period for all 
commissioning sources is at least three years; hence analyzing the continuation at just 
five years may not accurately show the retention propensity of individuals from 
commissioning sources. Therefore, attempts at generalizing from the above table about 
prior-enlisted officer longevity based on MECEP and ECP five-year continuation rates 
are not conclusive. 
Quester and Hiatt also examined the continuation rate when officers were divided 
into three groups based on overall TBS class rank. Although a gross aggregation, this 
division clearly showed that officers in the top third of their TBS class were more likely 
to continue than those in the bottom third with continuation percentages of 82.5% and 
67.6% respectively. Although Quester and Hiatt suggest that TBS rank is a good 
predictor of retention, whether a particular commissioning source or enlistment 
background dominated any of these three TBS groups, cannot be observed from their 
results. 
4. Study by O’Brien (2002) 
O’Brien (2002) analyzed the determinants of Marine Corps officers achieving ten 
years of commissioned service by commissioning program.  Using the Marine Corps 
Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) data file between 1981 and 1999, 
O’Brien found that officers commissioned through OCC and PLC are less likely to 
remain on active duty until the ten-year mark when compared with those from the USNA. 
In contrast, officers commissioned through MECEP have an increased likelihood of 
lasting to 10 years. However, as O’Brien points out, MECEP is highly selective. 
Participants have already proven themselves to have the necessary attributes of an officer 
and have several years of service prior to commissioning.  
O’Brien was unable to determine the effect of being prior enlisted on the retention 
of officers. At the time of his study, there was insufficient data to identify prior and non-
prior enlisted officers who had accessed through commissioning sources such as PLC, 






service data, a more detailed analysis of the effects of prior enlisted experience on officer 
retention behavior could have [been done] to determine the potential benefits to the 
officer corps”.11 O’Brien also found that marital status, TBS graduation rank, and 
occupational field were significant in predicting retention to ten years. 
5. Study by Finley (2002) 
Finley (2002), using some of the same data as O’Brien (2002), examined the 
success of Naval Academy graduates at The Basic School (TBS). Although the focus was 
on the effect of attendance at Officer Candidates School (OCS) on success at TBS, it was 
identified that those with prior enlisted Marine experience were likely to perform better at 
TBS. Additionally, it was found that race was significant, with whites performing better 
than other races. Finley also provided a detailed summary of the commissioning sources 
that has subsequently been cited by other related studies. 
6. Study by Ergun (2003) 
Ergun (2003), with the same data set used by O’Brien (2002), provided additional 
research focusing on promotion, retention, and performance. His retention results 
supported the results of O’Brien in finding that PLC and OCC had a negative effect on 
ten-year retention and MECEP had a positive effect (compared with USNA). However, 
unlike O’Brien, Ergun was able to identify all prior-enlisted officers and found that prior 
enlisted officers were more likely to retain to ten years than non-prior enlisted officers.  
Ergun was also able to show that marital status, age at commissioning, gender, 
TBS graduation rank, occupational field, and race/ethnic groups were significant in 
predicting retention to ten years. Married officers were 7.7 percent more likely to be 
retained to ten years than non-married officers and officers commissioned at an older age 
were also more likely to be retained. Women and blacks were found to be less likely to be 
retained. 
                                                 
11 William O’Brien, The Effect of Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Programs on Officer 






7. Study by Bowman (1995) 
The studies reviewed above have been concerned with quantitative analysis of 
retention or promotion. A further dimension to this thesis mentioned earlier in Chapter I 
is the cost-effectiveness of the commissioning sources. Although the literature regarding 
cost-effectiveness has been conducted using Navy commissioning sources, some of the 
findings and methodology are relevant to the Marine Corps. 
William R. Bowman, in his paper “Cost Effectiveness of Service Academies, 
New Evidence from Navy Warfare Communities” (Bowman 1995) proposed 
methodology for determining the cost-effectiveness of Navy commissioning sources 
which involved taking into account the steady state accessions required to replace losses. 
The basis of the analysis was that officers from each commissioning source had a 
different number of accessions required to maintain the force structure (i.e. prescribed 
number of career officers). His results show that although USNA graduates cost more on 
average, they are also more likely to remain on active duty. Therefore, on balance, USNA 
graduates are actually more cost-effective despite their higher pre-commissioning costs. 
8. Study by Bernard and Mehay (2003) 
Bernard and Mehay (2003) expanded Bowman’s (1995) study by examining the 
effect of each Navy commissioning program on retention and promotion with particular 
focus on the cost effectiveness of each program. The study differed from previous studies 
in that consideration was given to the marginal cost of commissioning programs rather 
than the average cost per officer contract. The results generally concurred with the earlier 
results of Bowman (1995) that “…USNA is the most cost-effective commissioning 
program for meeting future accession increases” for most communities with the 
exception of the Surface Warfare Community where Reserve Officer Training Course 
(Contract) is the most cost-effective.12 
 
                                                 







The literature rarely conflicts in the findings of those factors significant in 
predicting Marine Corps officer retention. Some of these factors affecting retention are 
not unique to the military, such as marital status, gender and unemployment rate. Other 
factors such as commissioning source, prior enlisted experience, and TBS graduation 
rank are uniquely military. The literature provides a good indication of the variables that 
should be included in any model attempting to determine the factors that affect retention.     
The studies of cost-effectiveness show that different accession sources are more 
cost-effective for different occupations than other accession sources. However, in 
general, it was found that when marginal rather than average attrition costs are 
considered, the USNA is often the most cost-effective despite its high average costs. The 
findings on cost-effectiveness suggest that on average, prior enlisted officers are unlikely 




































IV. METHODOLOGY FOR THE SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW 
The first research question in Chapter I asks: what effect does being a prior 
enlisted Marine have on officer longevity, ceteris paribus? This chapter discusses the 
methodology used to analyze the effect of prior enlisted status on officer longevity. The 
next chapter, Chapter V, discusses the results of the models detailed in this chapter. 
Incorporated in this chapter is a very brief overview of the Cox Regression 
Model. The mathematical theory behind the Cox Model is detailed and often 
complicated. As a result, and in the interests of brevity, this thesis will not provide the 
intricacies of the model itself.13 However, it is useful to provide a brief background on 
the fundamentals of the model to enable a better understanding of the coefficients it 
provides. After discussion of the Cox Model, the methodology, data, and assumptions 
used in developing the semi-parametric model for USMC retention are presented. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODEL 
1. The Cox Regression Model 
The Cox Regression Model, also known as a semi-parametric model, was 
proposed in 1972 and has since found wide circulation in survival analysis including 
analyses using censored data. The method has two particular advantages over others in 
that it does not require the selection of an underlying distribution of survival times, and it 
allows the incorporation of time-dependent covariates.14 Previous models had required 
the assumption of a distribution such as the exponential, Weibull, or gamma, to determine 
maximum likelihood estimates for survival.  
In examining the careers of Marine Corps officers, it might be expected that once 
an initial obligation period has been completed, survival rates might follow a particular 
distribution such as the exponential. However, there are various events during a career, 
                                                 
13 Sir David Cox proposed the method in 1972 in “Regression Models and Life Tables” (Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series B). 






including promotion and marriage, which might cause deviation from a known 
distribution. This could result in an assumed distribution being unreliable for some of the 
estimates. It is for this reason that the Cox Regression Model, which does not assume a 
distribution, could be an appropriate model for survival analysis of officers when the 
interest of the researcher is in the survival times and not the achievement of a particular 
milestone.15  
2. Proportional Hazards Model 
The Cox Regression Model combines the Proportional Hazards Model and an 
estimation method known as maximum partial likelihood. Theory surrounding the 
combination of proportional hazards and partial likelihood can become complicated; 
however the basic components of each of these aspects of the Cox model are relatively 
easy to explain.16  
The Proportional Hazards Model states that the hazard, or probability of an event 
occurring at time t, for an individual i is a proportion of the hazard for any other 
individual j. This can be represented as: 






       (1) 
where  hi(t) is the hazard for an individual at time t, and 
 hj(t) is the hazard for any other individual at time t. 
It is worthy of mention that the probability of an event occurring at exactly time t 
is zero; however a probability does exist for an occurrence between t and t+ t∆ . Then h(t) 
can therefore be defined as: 
0
Pr( | )( ) lim
t
t T t t T th t
t∆ →
≤ < + ∆ ≥= ∆       (2) 
where T is the event time for some particular individual. 
When the probability of an event occurring between t and t+ t∆  (given that the 
individual has already survived to time t) is divided by t∆ , the limit of the result is the 
                                                 
15 As discussed earlier, the logit model is appropriate for analyzing the achievement of a milestone. 
Previous studies using the same data have used ten year retention as the milestone. 






instantaneous probability of an event occurring at time t and can be interpreted as ‘the 
number of events per interval of time’. If hi(t) and hj(t) are further defined as: 
0 1 1
0 1 1
( ) ( ) exp( ... )
( ) ( ) exp( ... )
i i k ik
j j k jk
h t t x x




= + +       (3) 
where k is the number of covariates, ( )o tλ is a baseline function, and the x’s are 
characteristics of the individual, then the proportional hazard for an individual i against 
an individual j becomes:  
Proportional hazard = 1 1 1
( ) exp( ( ) ... ( ))
( )
i
i j k ik jk
j
h t x x x x
h t
β β= − + + − .17  (4) 
3. Partial Likelihood 
However, there is rarely just one additional individual j. The general methodology 
used for proportional hazards which cancels out the baseline function is also used in 
determining the partial likelihood. To illustrate, the partial likelihood of an event 
occurring at time t for an individual i can be written as: 
PL 0
1 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) exp( )
( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ) exp( ) ... ( ) exp( )( )
i i i
n
i i n i n
p
p i
h t h t t x
h t h t h t t x t xh t
λ β
λ β λ β+
=
= = =+ + + + +∑
  (5) 
where n is the number of surviving individuals in order of survival time. The 
denominator in this equation is the sum of the hazards of all individuals who have 
survived at least as long as individual i (recall that the hazard is also conditional on 
having survived until time t). The partial likelihood for all events is the product of all the 



















      
∏ ∑
  for all j it t≥       (6) 
 where iδ  = 0 for censored observations and 1 for uncensored observations. 
                                                 
17 The baseline function ( )o tλ will not be discussed in any further detail as it cancels out from the 
proportional hazard; however discussion of the baseline is included in most texts. The 'sβ can be estimated 






Further discussion of the partial likelihood theory is not necessary other than to 
state that estimates for the coefficients kβ  can now be obtained by maximizing the partial 
likelihood equation (6) with respect to kβ . 
4. Interpretation of Coefficients 
For ease of calculation, it is normal to take the logarithm of equation (6) the 
partial likelihood function. Subsequently, the resulting coefficients are the logarithms of 
the hazard ratio attributed to the covariate, and the exponential of the coefficient will give 
the hazard ratio. In practical terms, the hazard ratio gives the estimated percent change in 
the hazard for a one-unit increase in the covariate. Hence any value less than one 
represents a decrease in the hazard, and a value greater than one represents an increase in 
the hazard. The interpretation of coefficients will be detailed later in Chapter V. 
5. Dealing with Ties 
A problem with the likelihood equation given as equation (6) can occur when two 
or more events occur at the same time, or a ‘tie’ has occurred. For the data used in this 
thesis there are several instances where the months of service at separation for two 
individuals are the same, hence it is necessary to consider slightly different methods to 
deal with these occurrences. The mathematical theory to handle ties is complex and will 
not be discussed.18 There are effectively four different methods to handle ties known as 
the Breslow, Efron, exact and discreet methods.  
The Breslow and Efron methods are not as computationally complicated as the 
exact and discreet methods, and are intended to provide approximations for the exact 
method. However, because the software is available to use the exact and discreet 
methods, the Breslow and Efron methods were not considered. The discrete method 
assumes that events really occur at the same discrete time, whereas the exact method 
assumes that ties occur from grouping data into time periods.19 The data used in this 
thesis have time periods grouped into monthly intervals; hence the exact method is better 
suited for this analysis. 
                                                 
18 Paul D. Allison, Survival Analysis Using SAS (SAS Publishing, North Carolina, 2003), 127-137. 







1. Model Specification 
The model developed for analysis combines many insights from the literature in 
particular, O’Brien (2002) and Ergun (2003), in the choice of the variables to be 
included. An important difference is the inclusion of variables for prior enlisted service 
and prior enlisted rank. The model also controls for the fixed effects of the year of 
graduation from TBS. Therefore, the functional form of the model shown below also 
contains dummy variables for each of the commissioning years. The hazard for an 
individual i, or hi(t), can be represented as: 
 
 hi(t) = ( ) exp(o tλ × f(prior enlisted service, prior enlisted rank, gender, race, 
commissioning source, marital status, military occupation, commissioning age, TBS 
Performance, General Classification Test Category, year of commission) ) 
 
where ( )o tλ remains an unspecified baseline function. 
2. Hypothesis 
The major hypothesis that is tested concerns whether there is any difference in the 
length of commissioned service between prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers. 
That is: 
 
H0: The length of commissioned service for prior-enlisted officers is the same 
as the length of commissioned service for non-prior enlisted officers, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
H1: The length of commissioned service for prior-enlisted officers is not the 








3. Hypothesized Effects 
Table 3 shows the hypothesized effects of the variables given in the model 
specification on the longevity of an officer. The base case is a non-prior enlisted white 
unmarried male who graduated from USNA in 1986, completed TBS in the middle third 
of his class, and was assigned to a Combat Support Marine Occupation Specialty (MOS). 
The hypothesized effects are relative to the base case. 
Based on previous military studies, it is expected that prior enlisted officers will 
remain in the USMC longer than their non-prior enlisted counterparts, all other factors 
being equal. The only commissioning source that is expected to have a positive effect on 
longevity compared with the USNA is MECEP based on the results of previous studies.20 
Additionally, it is expected that officers graduating in the top third of their TBS class will 
remain on active duty longer than those graduating in the middle third; and those in the 
middle third longer than those in the bottom third. 
The effect of MOS is likely to vary across the categories because of the relative 
transferability of skills. It is hypothesized that officers who have obtained skills 
associated with their MOS that are easily transferable to jobs outside the military are 
more likely to leave the military than those with skills particularly unique to the military. 
For this reason it could be expected that Combat MOS officers would remain longer than 
Combat Support (CS) officers who would in turn stay longer than Combat Service 
Support (CSS) officers. 
The effects of personal characteristics are expected to be similar to those in the 
civilian sector. In general, it has been observed that married employees tend to have 
increased fiscal responsibilities within the family and therefore a greater desire for job 
stability, hence the turnover of married employees is smaller.21 Male employees do not 
generally experience the interrupted careers of their female counterparts; as a result, 
                                                 
20 See Levent Ergun, An Analysis of Officer Accession Programs and the Career Development of US 
Marine Corps Officers, (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 91., and William O’Brien, 
The Effect of Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Programs on Officer Retention, (Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 48. 
21 John L. Cotton and Jeffrey M. Tuttle, Employee Turnover: A Meta-Analysis and Review with 







being male is expected to have a positive effect on longevity.22 It has also been observed 
that employees from ethnic minority groups have lower turnover rates which can be 
explained in some part by a smaller number of alternatives. In summary, characteristics 
such as being married, male, or a minority officer are expected to have a positive effect 
on longevity whereas unmarried, female, and non-minority officers are hypothesized to 
leave earlier. 
 
Table 3.   Hypothesized Effects of Variables on Officer Longevity 
 
Variable Hypothesized effect 
Prior enlisted + 








Personal Characteristics  
Male Base 
Female - (cf male) 
Commissioning age  + 
Married + cf(unmarried) 
Unmarried Base 
White Base 
Black + (cf white) 
Hispanic + (cf white) 
Other race ? (cf white) 
Career Characteristics  
Top Third of TBS Class  + (cf middle 1/3) 
Middle Third of TBS Class Base 
Bottom Third of TBS Class - (cf middle 1/3) 
General Classification Test category + 
Combat PMOS + (cf CS MOS) 
Combat Support PMOS Base 
Combat Service Support  PMOS - (cf CS MOS) 
Source: Author 
 
                                                 






A final demographic characteristic expected to have a positive effect on officer 
longevity is the age of the officer at commissioning. As individuals age, the opportunities 
by which they can identify a successful job match are increased. Subsequently, the older 
an individual the greater chance of a successful job match.23 This observation is also 
expected to persist within USMC where it is hypothesized that the older the individual, 




The Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) data file 
was obtained from the Center for Naval Analysis. It consists of data from 1980 – 1999 
for all commissioned officers who attended TBS and consolidates information from 
several different sources as detailed in Quester and Hiatt (2001).  
The data file ends in September 2000 and includes officers commissioned 
between 1980 and 1999 inclusive. As a result of the end date of the data collection, many 
observations (officers) were still serving as of September 2000 which resulted in a right-
censored data file.  
 
E. DATA LIMITATIONS 
Although comprehensive in terms of the variables available for analysis, the 
MCCOAC file has several limitations regarding the data for this study. These limitations 
include censoring of the ranks included in the file, the reliability of some cohort data, the 
right censoring of data, and the accurate identification of voluntary and involuntary 
separations. This section further explains each of these limitations in more detail. 
The MCCOAC Data file provides data for personnel in ranks up to Lieutenant 
Colonel (LTC/O-5) inclusive. Attrition rates and characteristics of officers who resign 
after obtaining the rank of LTC cannot be obtained using this data. 
                                                 






Information on the career as an enlisted member before commissioning is not 
available prior to 1986 for officers enlisting through MECEP and ECP. Although we 
know that all officers entering through MECEP and ECP were prior enlisted, we do not 
know details such as what rank they were prior to commissioning or 
enlistment/promotion dates. This missing data effectively means that some models cannot 
be applied to officers who were commissioned prior to 1986. To allow models to be 
relevant for all cohorts, data are analyzed only for officers commissioned between 1986 
and 2000 inclusive. 
The total sample from 1986 - 2000, including prior enlisted, non-prior enlisted, 
separated and serving personnel is 18,464. Data prior to 1986 is not considered reliable. 
Of the 18,464 personnel, 7,586 had separated and the remaining officers were still 
serving as at September 2000. 
This study does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations. It 
is assumed that involuntary separations (post-commissioning) can be observed as random 
events, and do not affect either prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted officers 
disproportionately. This omission should create only minimal bias. 
 
F. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Table 4 shows the variables used in this thesis. The dependent variable used in the 
model is the number of months of commissioned service (num_mon). The MCCOAC 
data file has rounded months down to the nearest completed month. The resulting number 
of months is therefore recorded as a whole number. 
Many variables used in the model are self-explanatory and bivariate in nature. 
Such variables include gender, commissioning sources, highest enlisted rank, marital 
status, and race. Other variables require further explanation. 
Three binary variables were created representing broad categories of the final 
class position in which an officer graduated from TBS. The variable TBS_1_TH 
identifies all those officers who finished within the top third within their cohort. 







The data contain over 80 Primary MOS categories. Models using all of these 
MOS categories would be cumbersome. Personnel were therefore identified as belonging 
to a Combat, Combat Support (CS), or Combat Service Support (CSS) occupation field. 
For commonality, the MOS categories identified for each occupation field are the same as 
those used by O’Brien (p 61). These are indicated in Table 5.   
Marital Status is recorded several times for each individual in the data set, at 
various stages in his or her career. The first record of marital status in the data is the 
status at the first record as an officer, or shortly after completion of the respective 
commissioning program. Because marital status often changes during a career, and some 
commissioning sources restrict their officers to remaining unmarried during training, it is 
likely that the first record of marital status may not provide accurate information 
regarding the effect of marital status. As a result, rather than using the first record of 
marriage, the marital status used for analysis is the last recorded marital status. It is 
assumed that any effect on longevity due to marriage is more likely to be influenced by 
current marital status rather than marital status immediately after commissioning.   
Aside from the dependent variable, there are three other non-binary covariates. 
Commissioning age (comm_age) represents the age of the officer at his or her last 
birthday, in whole years at commissioning. The Months of service before commissioning 
date (prior_enlisted_months) is the number of months as an enlisted member before 
commissioning and includes time spent in preparation for TBS and time at TBS. This 
variable was rounded to the nearest whole month. The final non-binary variable is 








Table 4.   Variable Description 
 
Variable  Description Type 
NUM_MON Number of months since commissioning date Interval 
 Prior Enlisted Status  
Prior_enlist =1 if prior enlisted, =0 if non-prior enlisted Binary 
Rank_E1 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E1, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E2 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E2, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E3 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E3, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E4 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E4, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E5 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E5, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E6 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E6, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E7 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E7, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E8 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E8, 0 otherwise Binary 
Rank_E9 =1 if highest prior enlisted rank is E9, 0 otherwise Binary 
 Commissioning Source  
PLC =1 if commissioning source is PLC, 0 otherwise Binary 
OCC =1 if commissioning source is OCC, 0 otherwise Binary 
NROTC =1 if commissioning source is NROTC, 0 otherwise Binary 
MECEP =1 if commissioning source is MECEP, 0 otherwise Binary 
USNA =1 if commissioning source is USNA, 0 otherwise Binary 
ECP =1 if commissioning source is ECP, 0 otherwise Binary 
MCP =1 if commissioning source is MCP, 0 otherwise Binary 
 Personal Characteristics  
Female =1 if female, 0 if male Binary 
COMM_AGE Age at 1st commission Interval 
Married =1 if married on first record as officer, =0 if not married on first record Binary 
L_mar =1 if married at last known rank, =0 if unmarried at last known rank  Binary 
White =1 if White, =0 if non-white Binary 
Black =1 if Black, =0 if non-black Binary 
Hispanic =1 if Hispanic, =0 if non-hispanic Binary 
Other_race =1 if other race, = 0 if black, white or hispanic Binary 
Non-white =1 if Hispanic, black or other minority, =0 if white Binary 
 Career Characteristics  
TBS_1_TH =1 if TBS score is in top third of class, =0 if middle or bottom third Binary 
TBS_2_TH =1 if TBS score is in middle third of class, =0 if top or bottom third Binary 
TBS_3_TH =1 if TBS score is in bottom third of class, =0 if top or middle third Binary 
GCT_CAT GCT Category, GCT score less than or equal to 125 = 0, greater than 125 =1 Binary 
Prior_enlisted_mo Months of service before commissioning date Interval 
Combat_PMOS =1 if PMOS is combat occupation 24, =0 if CSS or CS Binary 
CS_PMOS =1 if PMOS is combat support occupation, = 0 if combat or CSS Binary 
CSS_PMOS =1 if PMOS is combat service support occupation, =0 if combat or CS Binary 
COMM_FY Year of commissioning  Interval 
 Censored Variable  
Attrited =1 if member separated prior to September 2000, =0 if still in on Sept 2000 Binary 
Source: Author 
 
   
                                                 







Table 5.   Primary Military Occupational Specialties Assigned to Occupational Field 
 
MOS Description MOS Description 
Combat Arms Occupational Group 
03XX  Infantry 
 
08XX Artillery 
18XX Tank and Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
 
  
Combat Support Occupational Group 
02XX Intelligence 05XX Marine Air Ground Task Force Plans 
 
13XX Engineer, Construction, 
Facilities and Equipment 
21XX Ordnance 
 
23XX Ammunition and Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal 
25XX Operational Communications 
 
26XX Signals Intelligence / Ground 
Electronics 
60/61XX Aircraft Maintenance 
63/64XX Avionics 
 
65XX Aviation Ordnance 
72XX Air Control / Air Support / Anti-air 
Warfare / Air Traffic Control 
73XX Navigation Officer / Enlisted Flight 
Crews 
75XX Naval Pilots / Naval Flight Officers 
 
  
Combat Service Support Occupational Group 
01XX Personnel and Administration 04XX Logistics 
 
06XX Command and Control Systems 11XX Utilities 
 
28XX Ground Electronics Maintenance 30XX Supply Administration and Operations 
 
31XX Traffic Management 33XX Food Service 
 
34XX Financial Management 35XX Motor Transport 
 
40XX Data Systems 41XX Marine Corps Exchange 
 
43XX Public Affairs 44XX Legal Services 
 
46XX Visual Information 55XX Music 
 
57XX Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 58XX Military Police and Corrections 
 
59XX Electronics Maintenance 66XX Aviation Logistics 
 
68XX Meteorological and Oceanographic 
(METOC) Services 
70XX Airfield Services 
 







G. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Cox Regression Assumption 
Use of the Cox Regression Method requires the assumption that the hazards are 
proportional over time. That is, the hazard ratio is constant over the survival time, which 
implies that the cumulative hazard function will increase in a straight line. The software 
used in this analysis (SAS) provides a graphical function which allows the survival rates 
(and log survival rates) to be observed. If a plot of the logarithm of the survival rates is a 
straight line, the hazard is constant. When this plot is created for the data, both at the 
aggregated and MOS level, it is observed that after the initial obligation period, the 
hazard does appear to be constant.  
2. Data Assumptions 
In addition to the assumption of constant hazard function, several other 
assumptions are necessary concerning the data itself. Specifically, two of the binary 
variables (marital status and MOS) can change during a career. Marital status may 
include a divorce or even subsequent marriages, and MOS can change with transfers 
between occupations.  
As mentioned earlier, the marital status used was the last recorded as it was found 
to contain the lowest number of missing values. Marital status can change over time 
however it is assumed that the effect of marriage on longevity can best be measured by 
identifying those officers who were recorded as married on their most recent record. 
It is also possible that officers may transfer between one or more MOS categories 
during their career in an attempt at job matching within the USMC. The occurrence of a 
MOS change is expected to be very small for prior enlisted officers as they are more 
likely to have already changed into the MOS for which they are best suited either before 
or on commissioning.  The occurrences may be slightly larger for non-prior enlisted 
officers who have not had the same opportunity to seek a suitable job match within the 
USMC. The MOS used was the last recorded, as it is assumed that any effect attributable 
to MOS would be as a result of the last MOS. It is not expected that previous MOS would 


































V. RESULTS OF THE SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODEL 
A. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Most tables in this section show the difference in length of commissioned service 
between prior and non-prior enlisted officers, for those officers who have separated.25 It 
should be recognized that the tables do not control for the effects of other variables, 
hence not all of the effects reported in the table are due solely to the variable examined. 
Additionally, it is obviously not possible to report the length of commissioned service at 
separation for those still serving, hence large amounts of data have been censored from 
some tables. 
1. Commissioning Source 
Table 6 provides the percentage breakdown of the total sample of 18,464 officers 
by commissioning source (numbers in parentheses). All officers commissioned through 
the MECEP, ECP and MCP programs are prior enlisted. The table indicates that 34.09 
percent of the sample is prior enlisted. The main commissioning source for prior enlisted 
officers is OCC (45.76 percent) followed by PLC (21.16 percent). The main 
commissioning source for non-prior enlisted officers is PLC (41.32 percent) followed by 
NROTC (26.86 percent). Overall, PLC, OCC and NROTC commission almost 79 percent 
of all Marine Corps officers. 
 
                                                 











Percent (%)  of 
Prior enlisted 
Personnel 
Percent (%) of 
Non-prior 
enlisted personnel
Percent (%) of 
total sample 
Percent (%) of 
those separated 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
     
Other  0.33 (21)  0.42 (51)  0.39 (72)  0.20 (15) 
PLC  21.16 (1330)  41.32 (5034)  34.47 (6364)  38.12 (2892) 
OCC  45.76 (2874)  14.62 (1780)  25.21 (4654)  24.68 (1872) 
NROTC  4.49 (282)  26.86 (3270)  19.24 (3552)  22.04 (1672) 
MECEP  13.06 (820)  -  4.44 (820)  1.77 (134) 
ECP  10.37 (653)  -  3.54 (653)  3.06 (232) 
USNA  1.32 (83)  16.28 (1982)  11.18 (2065)  9.44 (716) 
MCP  3.26 (205)  -  1.11 (205)  0.08 (6) 
     
n  34.09 (6268)  65.91 (12117) 100.00(18385) 100.00 (7539) 
Source. MCCOAC Data, missing data = 79 from total (15 prior enlisted, 64 non-prior enlisted), 47 from separated. 
 
2. Length of Commissioned Service 
Column (d) in Table 7 shows the average number of commissioned months for 
each of the commissioning sources for those officers who have separated. Overall, the 
average length of commissioned service was over 72 months; however there was a large 
difference between commissioning sources. MECEP officers have the longest length of 
service of over 92 months while MCP officers have the shortest length of service of just 
46 months (although the separated MCP officers in the sample number only six).  
Columns (b) and (c) show the length of commissioned service for prior enlisted 
and non-prior enlisted officers respectively. The number of officers in each group is 
indicated in parentheses. Aside from MCP officers having a relatively short length of 
service, it is noted that all other commissioning sources have average lengths of service at 
least 17 months less than MECEP officers. The variation among the non-prior enlisted 
commissioning sources is not as large with fewer than 17 months separating OCC, which 
was the source with the shortest average length of service of almost 66 months, from 
USNA which had the longest average length of service of over 82 months. 
It is evident from Table 7 that for those commissioning sources accepting both 
prior and non-prior enlisted officers, prior enlisted officers remain in the USMC as 






officers have a length of commissioned service between six and nine months shorter than 
non-prior enlisted officers, for those officers who have separated. 
Overall, there appears to be a 10 month difference between the length of 
commissioned service of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers. However, the 
practical significance of this figure, and the potential influence of the censored data (i.e. 
those personnel not yet separated), means no firm conclusions can yet be drawn. In 
practical terms, 10 months may not be a significant enough time difference to 
dramatically affect manpower planning and necessitate differentiating between prior and 
non-prior enlisted. Importantly, there are large numbers of officers who are currently 
serving whose length of service has not been incorporated into the average length of 
service; hence some or all of the 10 month difference may be explained either by other 
factors, or by the censored data.26 
 





Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 




Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated officers 
(months) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Other 38.00 (9) 55.67 (6) 46.06 (15) 
PLC 69.26 (378) 75.60 (2510) 74.77 (2888) 
OCC 58.64 (974) 65.81 (897) 62.08 (1871) 
NROTC 66.06 (78) 74.98 (1593) 74.57 (1671) 
MECEP 92.16 (134) - 92.16 (134) 
ECP 62.92 (230) - 62.92 (230) 
USNA 75.00 (18) 82.49 (697) 82.31 (715) 
MCP 46.33 (6) - 46.33 (6) 
    
 64.17 (1827) 74.71 (5703) 72.15 (7530) 
Source. MCCOAC Data, missing data = 56. 
 
                                                 
26 The sample reveals that of the 6820 prior enlisted officers, 73.1 percent still remain. In contrast, of 
the 12,170 NPE officers, 52.8 percent still remain; this amount of censored data has a large impact on the 
results. For example, the table indicates that MCP officers have a very short length of commissioned 







The difference in length of commissioned service by gender is detailed in Table 8. 
The length of service of females is almost nine months less than males on average. The 
distribution of females into their prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted groups shows that 
in both groups length of commissioned service is five to seven months less for females 
than for males (numbers are shown in parentheses). The practical significance and effect 
of censored data is unknown; however the figures show tentative support for the literature 
in regard to female turnover resulting from interrupted careers.  
 
Table 8.   Length of Commissioned Service by Gender for Separated Officers (1986-
1999) 
 Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Non-prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated officers 
(months) 
Male 64.62  (1674) 78.85  (5515) 75.54  (7189) 
Female 59.53  (161) 71.83  (223) 66.67  (384) 
    
Total 64.17  (1835) 78.57  (5738) 72.17  (7573) 
Source. MCCOAC Data, missing data =13. 
 
4. Age Distribution 
Table 9 shows the average commissioning age for prior and non-prior enlisted 
officers (numbers are shown in parentheses). The entire sample of 18,464 officers can be 
used to calculate these figures. The average commissioning age is 23.56 years while the 
average commissioning age of prior and non-prior enlisted officers is 25.11 and 22.75 
years respectively, a difference of 2.36 years. As anticipated, the commissioning age of 
the exclusively prior enlisted commissioning sources (MECEP, ECP and MCP) is higher 
than for other sources. Additionally, within USNA, NROTC and PLC, prior enlisted 











Avg age when 
commissioned  
Prior enlisted  
(years) 




Avg age when 
commissioned  
(years) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
other 26.19 (21) 22.16 (51) 23.33  (72) 
PLC 23.78 (1318) 22.69 (4987) 22.92 (6305) 
OCC 24.84 (2849) 24.30 (1766) 24.63 (4615) 
NROTC 24.15 (272) 22.24 (3156) 22.40 (3428) 
MECEP 26.91 (816) - 26.91 (816) 
ECP 26.45 (647) - 26.45 (647) 
USNA 24.74 (73) 22.28 (1825) 22.37 (1898) 
MCP 25.17 (205) - 27.17 (205) 
    
Total 25.11  (6216) 22.75  (11843) 23.56 (18059) 
Source. MCCOAC Data. Missing data = 405 
 
5. Race 
Table 10 shows the difference in length of commissioned service by 
race/ethnicity. Non-white officers consistently have a shorter average length of 
commissioned service than white officers with black officers having an average length of 
service over eight months less than white officers, and Hispanic officers four months less. 
The difference between whites and non-whites is not as it was hypothesized; however, as 
with other variables, the effect of censored data is unknown. 
 
Table 10.   Length of Commissioned Service by Ethnicity for Separated Officers 
(1986-1999) 
Race/Ethnicity Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Non-prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated officers 
(months) 
White 65.30 (1514) 75.22 (4988) 72.91 (6502) 
Black 55.89 (157) 69.01 (302) 64.52 (459) 
Hispanic 60.88 (88) 71.88 (234) 68.87 (322) 
Other race 62.64 (76) 74.47 (215) 71.38 (291) 
    
Total 64.17 (1835) 74.73 (5739) 72.17  (7574) 








6. Marital Status 
Table 11 gives the length of commissioned service for married and unmarried 
officers as defined by their last recorded marital status. It can be observed that married 
officers appear to remain for around 15 months longer than unmarried officers regardless 
of whether they were prior enlisted or not. Even though the table uses censored data, it 
suggests that marital status may be a significant variable in the survival analysis. 
 
Table 11.   Length of Commissioning Service by Last Recorded Marital Status 
Separated Officers (1986-1999) 
Marital 
Status 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Non-prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated 
officers 
(months) 
Married 71.86 (963) 82.61 (2698) 79.78 (3661) 
Unmarried 55.68 (872) 67.74 (3041) 65.05 (3913) 
    
Total 64.17 (1835) 74.73 (5739) 72.17  (7574) 
Source: MCCOAC Data, missing data =12. 
 
7. TBS Thirds 
Table 12 shows the average length of commissioned service by TBS class rank. 
For both prior and non-prior enlisted officers, and overall, the average length of 
commissioned service decreases from the top to the bottom third. Again, prior enlisted 
officers have a shorter length of commissioned service than non-prior enlisted officers; 
however, the table is also subject to the effects of censored data. 
 
Table 12.   Length of Commissioned Service by TBS Class Rank Separated 
Officers (1986-1999) 
 Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Non-prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated officers 
(months) 
Top Third 72.27 (479) 78.50 (1577) 77.05 (2056) 
Middle Third 65.83 (558) 76.18 (1930) 73.86 (2488) 
Bottom Third 58.42 (791) 70.91 (2227) 67.63 (3018) 
    
Total 64.31 (1828) 74.77 (5734) 72.24 (7562) 







8. Occupation Field 
Table 13 shows the length of commissioned service by MOS category. The 
figures indicate that Combat and CSS officers have a much shorter length of 
commissioned service than CS officers. It also appears that prior enlisted officers have a 
shorter period of commissioned service across all three broad MOS categories. As with 
earlier tables, the impact of the censored data is unknown; however, the difference 
between CS and the other MOS categories may well be too large to be explained by 
censored data. 
 




Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Non-prior enlisted  
(months) 
Avg length of 
commissioned service 
for all separated officers 
(months) 
Combat 61.83 (513) 69.69 (1670) 67.84 (2183) 
CS 79.91 (352) 94.22 (1611) 91.65 (1963) 
CSS 59.88 (670) 65.62 (1541) 63.88 (2211) 
    
Total 65.13 (1535) 76.58 (4822) 72.82 (6357) 
Source. MCCOAC Data. Missing data =1219 (302 prior enlisted) 
 
9. Prior Enlisted Rank 
Table 14 provides the average length of commissioned service for prior enlisted 
officers sorted by their highest rank prior to commissioning. The results are ambiguous 
showing that officers whose highest enlisted rank was E-1 or E-2 have an average length 
of service of over 67 months, those whose highest rank was E-3 to E-5 have an average 
length of service of around 61 months, and officers who reached E-6 and E-7 have much 
linger commissioned service of over 103 months. This may be explained in some part by 
the fact that E-6 and E-7 officers are older at commissioning, and therefore more likely to 
be associated with a good job match. Additionally they may be more likely to be closer to 








Table 14.   Length of Commissioned Service for Prior Enlisted Officers by 
Highest Enlisted Rank 
Rank Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
Rank Avg length of 
commissioned service 
Prior enlisted  
(months) 
E1 67.39 (96) E5 60.93 (1113) 
E2 67.30 (167) E6 103.86 (88) 
E3 61.29 (204) E7 128.00 (8) 
E4 60.10 (153)   
Source. MCCOAC Data. Missing data = 8. 
 
B. MODEL RESULTS 
Table 15 shows the regression results using the Cox Regression Model. Three 
different models were explored with slight differences in the variables included in each 
model. The first model groups all prior enlisted officers into one category, the second 
model separates the prior enlisted officers into groups based on their highest enlisted 
rank, and the third model is a reduced form of model 1 which does not control for the 
commissioning year.  
1. Model 1 Results 
The first model indicates that, ceteris paribus, prior enlisted officers have a 
smaller hazard ratio than non-prior enlisted officers. In fact, the coefficient and hazard 
ratio can be interpreted to indicate that prior enlisted officers have about 94 percent of the 
hazard of non-prior enlisted officers, which is significant at the 0.10 level.  
The commissioning sources were found to be among the most influential 
variables affecting the survival of officers. All commissioning sources, except MCP, 
were found to be highly significant (<0.01 level) when compared against the base case 
which was USNA. MECEP officers, as hypothesized, exhibited a hazard just 72 percent 
of the hazard for USNA graduates, ceteris paribus. Conversely, OCC graduates exhibit a 
hazard 173 percent that of USNA graduates indicating that their survival rate is much 






Commissioning age and marital status were also found to be significant at all the 
usual levels. Married officers had a hazard of just 42 percent of that who were not 
married, all else being equal. This rather large effect implies that officers are much more 
likely to remain in the USMC when they are married. This result corresponds with 
discussions in the literature regarding the decreased mobility and turnover of married 
workers. No significant effects due to gender or race/ethnic group were identified in the 
model. 
The interpretation of the hazard rate for commissioning age, which was also 
significant at all the usual levels, is somewhat different from that for binary variables. 
The hazard ratio of 0.966 indicates that a one-year increase in commissioning age 
decreases the hazard by 100(1-0.966) percent, or 3.4 percent. For example, if all other 
factors were the same, the difference in hazard between a 28 and a 26 year old officer at 
commissioning would be 6.8 percent decrease for the 28 year old. 
The rank in the graduation class from TBS was found to be very significant at all 
the usual levels. Officers graduating in the top third of TBS had a hazard of 86 percent of 
the hazard of those graduating in the middle third. By contrast, officers graduating in the 
bottom third had an increased hazard when compared with the middle third of 124 
percent. The reason for this difference should be subject to further analysis. However, it 
may reflect those finishing in the top third having a better job match than those in the 
bottom third. 
The size of the hazard for officers with Combat and CSS MOS was unexpected as 
was the negative effect of Combat MOS on longevity, which was not the hypothesized 
effect. It was expected that the low transferability of combat skills to the civilian sector 
would result in a lower hazard for combat officers than both CS and CSS officers. 
Holding other factors equal, both Combat and CSS officers have a much higher hazard 
than CS officers of 176 percent and 200 percent respectively with coefficients significant 
at all the usual levels. The reasons for the large hazard rates are unclear; however aspects 
such as the transferability of learned skills, job satisfaction, worker fatigue, or successful 






2. Model 2 Results 
Model 2 replaced the prior enlisted variable with the highest rank prior to 
commissioning. The base case for the prior enlisted rank was no prior enlisted rank, in 
other words, non-prior enlisted officers. Only two ranks were found to be significant 
which may reflect in part the small practical and statistical significance of the prior 
enlisted variable in model 1. It was found that the hazard for a prior enlisted officer who 
held the rank of E-3 was 84.8 percent of the hazard for a non-prior enlisted officer, 
significant at the 0.05 level and holding other factors equal. The hazard for an E-4 was 
82.9 percent of the hazard for non-prior enlisted officers, significant at the 0.10 level.  
Holding the rank of E-5 prior to commissioning was not significant. Additionally, 
its hazard estimate was close to one providing evidence that the hazard rate for E-5s is no 
different to non-prior enlisted officers. As E-5s make up the majority of prior enlisted 
officers (see Table 14), the fact that prior enlisted officers in model 1 was significant may 
be impacted more by E-1 to E-4s, who all had hazard rates less than one, than higher 
ranks who all had hazard rates higher than one (although none were significant). The 
results suggest that the positive effects of being prior enlisted on the survival of officers 
apply more to those holding the rank of E-1 to E-4 rather than higher ranks.  
The remaining significant hazards are very similar to the hazards found in model 
1 with most results differing by less than one percent. However, MECEP officers further 
decreased their comparative hazard from 72 percent in model 1 to 65 percent in model 2. 
The hazard for OCC and ECP also decreased in comparison with model 1, but they still 
remain at 170 and 169 percent of the hazard for USNA graduates respectively. 
3. Model 3 Results 
The third model was a reduced form of model 1 which removed the fixed effect 
variables for the commissioning year. Most hazards are within one percent of the hazards 
in model 1 with the exception of the prior enlisted hazard, which decreases to 91 percent 
of the hazard for non-prior enlisted officers compared with 94 percent in model 1. 
Additionally, the significance of this variable is increased from the 0.10 level in model 1 






Table 15.   Regression Results Using the Cox Regression Methoda 














      
Prior enlisted -0.06366 0.938*   -0.0923 0.912** 
E1   -0.12329 0.884   
E2   -0.1245 0.883   
E3   -0.16505 0.848**   
E4   -0.18776 0.829*   
E5   0.00766 1.008   
E6   0.04084 1.042   
E7   0.31004 1.363   
Commissioning 
Source        
PLC 0.28432 1.329*** 0.29072 1.337*** 0.26975 1.31*** 
OCC 0.55035 1.734*** 0.52874 1.697*** 0.53965 1.715***
NROTC 0.18136 1.199*** 0.18305 1.201*** 0.18201 1.2*** 
MECEP -0.32892 0.720*** -0.42473 0.654*** -0.31017 0.733***
ECP 0.55724 1.746*** 0.52503 1.691*** 0.55358 1.739***
MCP -0.27773 0.758 -0.31457 0.73 -0.34143 0.711 
Personal 
Characteristics       
Female -0.10012 0.905 -0.11543 0.891* -0.0985 0.906 
COMM_AGE -0.0341 0.966*** -0.03392 0.967*** -0.03744 0.963***
Married -0.88585 0.412*** -0.88592 0.412*** -0.85882 0.424***
Black -0.07498 0.928 -0.07254 0.93 -0.07778 0.925 
Hispanic -0.043 0.958 -0.04432 0.957 -0.05601 0.946 
Other race -0.05194 0.949 -0.04856 0.953 -0.04996 0.951 
Career 
Characteristics       
Top TBS third -0.15112 0.86*** -0.15089 0.86*** -0.14878 0.862***
Bottom TBS third 0.21813 1.244*** 0.21707 1.242*** 0.21837 1.244***
GCT category 0.03143 1.032 0.03116 1.032 0.03275 1.033 
Combat PMOS 0.5636 1.757*** 0.56571 1.761*** 0.558 1.747***
CSS PMOS 0.69505 2.004*** 0.69709 2.008*** 0.69014 1.994***
       
comm_87 0.29824 1.347*** 0.29066 1.337***   
comm_88 0.2712 1.312*** 0.27408 1.315***   
comm_89 0.15319 1.166*** 0.1535 1.166***   
comm_90 0.07969 1.083 0.08478 1.088   
comm_91 0.05117 1.052 0.05316 1.055   
comm_92 -0.01509 0.985 -0.02317 0.977   
comm_93 -0.12629 0.881* -0.12538 0.882*   






comm_95 -0.02496 0.975 -0.01022 0.99   
comm_96 0.10716 1.113 0.11845 1.126   
comm_97 -0.10646 0.899 -0.09271 0.911   
comm_98 -0.27044 0.763 -0.26163 0.77   
comm_99 0.47032 1.6 0.48043 1.617   
      
n 14953  14953  14953  
-2 Log L 103204.25  103195.68  103303.70  
Likelihood Ratio 2250.78  2259.36  2151.34  
Source: Author.  
a. * indicates significant at the 0.10 level, ** is significant at the 0.05 level and *** is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
C. COMPARISON OF RESULTS AGAINST OTHER RESEARCH 
The models developed by O’Brien and Ergun include some different variables; 
however, they can be compared with the Cox Regression Results in terms of their 
magnitude and significance. Hazard ratios of less than one in the Cox model should 
generally have coefficients with a positive (+) sign in the logit model, and ratios greater 
than one should have coefficients with a negative (-) sign. This reflects the positive or 
negative effects of variables on either retention in the logit model, or longevity in the Cox 
model. Similarly, variables found to be significant in the logit model may also be 
expected to be significant in the Cox model, although this is not always the case, 
particularly at low levels of significance in the logit model. 
The effects attributed to a variable can also differ greatly under the logit and Cox 
models.27 For example, Ergun estimates that officers graduating from PLC and OCC 
have ten-year retention rates three and nine percentage points lower than USNA 
graduates respectively. On the other hand, the Cox Regression Model implies the hazard 
for PLC and OCC graduates are 133 percent and 173 percent of the hazard for USNA 
graduates respectively. The Cox model implies the effects due to these two 
commissioning sources on survival are much greater than the logit effects on ten-year 
retention.  
The difference can be explained, in part, using table 7. The logit model is only 
concerned with officers who do or do not make the ten-year milestone. However, some 
                                                 
27 The calculation of the effects of variables under the logit model is not intuitive. In the separate 
studies by O’Brien and Ergun, the calculated marginal effects show the percentage point increase in ten 






officers, particularly those from OCC, fall significantly short of ten years. In fact, table 7 
implies they fall almost five years short of the ten year milestone on average. Similarly, 
PLC officers may fall around four years short of the ten year mark on average. Because 
the logit model does not distinguish between falling many years short or just a few days 
short of ten years, the effects attributed to the commissioning sources by the logit model 
cannot be applied to survival or longevity and may provide an inaccurate indication of the 
true effects.   
In contrast, O’Brien attributes large significant negative effects on ten year 
retention for PLC and OCC graduates of 47.3  percent and 57.1 percent respectively. The 
magnitude of O’Brien’s results are closer to the magnitude provided by the Cox 
regression. Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive effect of MECEP graduate status 
provided by O’Brien (51.0 percent) is also closer to the magnitude provided by the Cox 
regression. 
The effects attributed to marital status vary between Ergun and O’Brien; however 
both have a significant positive effect on ten-year retention. O’Brien’s results indicate 
that married officers are 47.2 percent more likely to stay until the 10th year, whereas 
Ergun predicts it to be much smaller at 7.7 percent. The Cox regression model also 
indicates a strong positive effect on survival of an order likely to be closer to that of 
O’Brien.  
All models, including the Cox regression, estimated strong effects due to class 
rank. O’Brien’s regression indicates that those in the top third are 19 percent more likely 
to stay until the 10th year and those in the bottom third are 46.8 percent less likely when 
compared to the middle third. The Cox regression provides the same ordering of the class 
rank.  
O’Brien’s model indicates that CSS officers have a large and significant negative 
effect on ten-year retention of 30.1 percent. The Cox model concurs with this result 







D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THE COX REGRESSION MODEL 
The results indicate that although being a prior enlisted officer has a small 
positive effect on survival rates, there are other variables that have a much greater effect 
and are of more practical significance. The commissioning source was found to have a 
strong effect on survival rates with most commissioning sources exhibiting a negative 
effect on survival rates when compared with USNA graduates. The only exception was 
MECEP graduates. 
Of the demographic characteristics, the commissioning age was found to have a 
small positive effect; however, the practical significance is smaller than for other effects. 
Marital status was found to have a very strong positive effect on survival rates with 
married officers exhibiting a much smaller hazard than unmarried officers. 
The effect of class standing from TBS was found to have varying effects 
depending on the third of the class that an officer was grouped into. Those graduating in 
the top third of the class had a greater survival rate (smaller hazard) than those in the 
middle third who had a greater survival rate than those in the bottom third.  
The effect of the MOS categories was much greater than expected with both 
Combat and Combat Service Support officers exhibiting dramatically increased hazards, 
or smaller survival rates, than those in Combat Support. The reasons for the significance 
of this result may require focused research from a sociological perspective. Table 16 
provides a summary of the observed effects compared with the hypothesized effects 







Table 16.      Summary Table of Hypothesized and Observed Effects from the Cox 
Regression Method 
Variable Hypothesized effect Observed effect 
Prior enlisted + + 
Commissioning Source   
USNA Base Base 
PLC - - 
OCC - - 
NROTC - - 
MECEP + + 
ECP - - 
MCP - - 
Personal Characteristics   
Male Base Base 
Female - (cf male) 0 
Commissioning age  + + 
Married + cf(unmarried) + 
Unmarried Base Base 
White Base Base 
Black + (cf white) 0 
Hispanic + (cf white) 0 
Other race ? (cf white) 0 
Career Characteristics   
Top Third of TBS Class  + (cf middle 1/3) + 
Middle Third of TBS Class Base Base 
Bottom Third of TBS Class - (cf middle 1/3) - 
GCT category + 0 
Combat PMOS + (cf CS MOS) 0 
Combat Support PMOS Base Base 



































VI. METHODOLOGY FOR ACCESSION OPTIMIZATION 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Although there is a large body of literature regarding the cost-effectiveness of 
Navy commissioning sources, little has been written on the cost-effectiveness of USMC 
commissioning sources. Many of the methods used by Bowman (1995) and Bernard 
(2003) in analyzing cost-effectiveness of Navy commissioning sources could be applied 
to the USMC case, particularly those cost-effectiveness methods that use marginal costs 
rather than average costs. However, the compilation of the necessary USMC data to 
obtain marginal costs is beyond the scope of this thesis and consequently the USMC 
commissioning source average costs are used. The focus of this and the following chapter 
is on the balance between the cost of each type of officer (prior enlisted and non-prior 
enlisted), and the accessions required to obtain the optimum number of USMC personnel 
from the commissioning sources. 
The second research question posed in Chapter 1 asks: What is the optimal mix of 
prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions such that the force structure can be 
maintained without resulting in vacancies at various ranks and without exceeding the 
fiscal budget? This chapter discusses the methodology used to determine the optimal mix 
of officers. The next chapter, Chapter VII, discusses the results of the model detailed in 
this chapter. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE NON-PARAMETRIC MODEL 
The research question presents an objective function, a function of two variables 
(prior and non-prior enlisted officer accession numbers) that is the focus for optimization. 
In addition, there are two broad constraining factors on the optimal mix of officers (the 
objective function) that must be explored. The first is a fiscal constraint on the number of 
officer accessions. The second constraint is the requirement for a particular number of 
officers in certain ranks. There may be many other constraining factors that impact the 






A linear form, described later in this chapter, is developed for each of the 
constraints. To meet the second constraint on the number of O-4’s required, a non-
parametric Markov model is used. The non-parametric nature of the model considers only 
a comparison of non-prior and prior enlisted officers as they ‘survive’ from one year to 
the next. An important difference between the parametric and non-parametric models in 
this thesis is that in the non-parametric model, the differences between prior and non-
prior enlisted survival rates do not take into account the confounding effects of other 
variables such as marital status, commissioning source, etc. As a result, in the non-
parametric model, only the survival behavior of officers as separated by prior and non-
prior enlisted status can be observed and not the effects of any other factors shown to 
affect survival. 
When the two constraints are applied to the objective function it is possible to 
develop a simple linear program. The goal of the linear program is not necessarily to 
minimize expenditure on officer accessions, or to maximize accession numbers; rather it 
is to obtain a prescribed number of officers at a particular rank using the prescribed 
accession budget. It is expected that the intersection of the two constraints, from both a 
fiscal and force structure perspective, represents a mix of officers that satisfies the 
requirements of both constraints and optimizes accessions with respect to the two 
constraints. 
1. Fiscal Constraint 
The fiscal constraint compares the costs and benefits of a prior enlisted officer 
with a non-prior enlisted counterpart. If costs for non-prior enlisted officers are higher, 
then at one extreme, if all officers were non-prior enlisted, we might expect higher 
recruiting and training costs which would imply a smaller number of officers accessed 
with a given budget. At the other extreme, if all officers were prior enlisted it could imply 
a different, and potentially lower, total accession cost with higher numbers of officers for 






Discussion and theory of the fiscal constraint are discussed in more detail in 
Section F of this chapter. In essence, the fiscal constraint asks “what are the possible 
combinations of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers given a particular accession 
budget?” 
2. Force Structure Constraint 
The force structure constraint concerns the ability of the accession sources to 
provide sufficient quantities of personnel to the senior ranks. Chapter V indicated that 
separation rates for commissioning sources are different; it follows that changing the 
proportion of officers from each commissioning source would also change the overall 
separation rate.  
Maintaining the force structure requires balancing separation rates such that they 
are neither too high nor low. The consequences of high separation rates, such as increased 
vacancies and decreased readiness, are generally intuitive. There are other secondary 
consequences such as a decrease in time-in-rank criteria for promotion resulting in faster 
promotion, less experienced senior officers, and a younger officer corps. Low separation 
rates also have consequences such as pressures on end strength, increases in time-in-rank 
for promotion, ageing of the officer corps, more competitive promotion and forced 
separations. 
The theory of the force structure constraint is discussed in more detail in Section 
G of this chapter. The constraint asks ‘what are the possible combinations of prior 
enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers necessary to maintain readiness, given the attrition 
rates for each type of accession and the force structure?’. 
3. Other Complicating Factors 
There are several other factors that can complicate the optimization. Not all prior 
enlisted officers or non-prior enlisted officers are commissioned through the same source. 
Although all attend The Basic School (TBS), there are several different commissioning 
routes they may follow prior to TBS; and therefore the cost of one prior enlisted officer 
will not necessarily be the same as the cost of another. Similarly, the costs for different 








Solving the linear programming problem described earlier obviously requires the 
determination of a linear form for the constraints. The precise methodology for 
determining each constraint is detailed later in this chapter while general theory regarding 
Markov models is included in this section. Once the two constraints have been defined, 
linear programming techniques using spreadsheet applications (specifically Microsoft 
Excel Solver) can be used to find an optimal solution. Fortunately, in this specific case 
where there are only two constraints, it is most likely that the optimum will occur at their 
intersection, although this may not be the case in other linear programs.  
1. Accession Possibilities Diagram 
The starting point in the methodology for determining an accession optimum is 
recognition of an Accession Possibilities Diagram (APD). The APD represents the 
possible theoretical combination of prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions into 
the USMC. Without any constraints on accessions whatsoever, any combination of prior 
and non-prior enlisted officers is possible. The lack of constraints is, however, unrealistic. 
At the most elementary level, the number of accessions is restricted by the number of 
people who would pass the USMC officer selection criteria, and those who would wish to 
become USMC officers. Figure 1 shows the most basic APD without constraints for 
which any combination is possible. The points simply represent examples of accession 
possibilities from either prior or non-prior enlisted officers. 
Figure 2 represents the same APD but introduces two constraints.28 Should these 
lines represent the fiscal and force structure constraints, an optimal point may be 
represented by their intersection, Z. The bold sections of the line represent other possible 
solutions that adhere to both constraints although any point along the bold lines would 
not be an optimal point. Any point outside the bold lines would not be a feasible solution 
even if it fell within one of the constraints. All feasible solutions reside between the 
origin and the bold lines as indicated by the shaded area. 
                                                 
28 The diagram shows that the constraints have intercepted both with each other and the axis however 






Practical values for USMC officer accessions must be considered. Although the 
intersection of the bold lines with the horizon may be theoretically possible ‘optimal’ 
solutions in terms of the linear program, they would not have a basis in reality. The range 
over which the constraints are valid is discussed in the next chapter; however, as a 
precursor, it is unrealistic to expect the constraints to be linear over the entire range of 
possibilities. 
The fiscal and force structure constraints for officer optimization will be 
discussed in more detail in Sections F and G respectively. A model for determination of 
the fiscal constraint does not warrant discussion prior to Section F, however discussion of 








Figure 1.   Basic Accession Possibilities Frontier Diagram 
 
Figure 2.   Accession Possibilities Frontier with Constraints 
 








































































2. Markov Model Specification 
The data used for the non-parametric model, and described in Section D of this 
chapter, allow for the construction of a Markov-type transition matrix with absorption. 
The transition matrix identifies the proportion of personnel who transition from one 
‘state’ to another. In the case of an officer career transition matrix, the ‘state’ could be 
represented by a year of service (YOS) in which case the transition is the proportion of 
personnel who transition from their first YOS to a second YOS and so on. Alternatively, 
a ‘state’ could represent a rank and the transition would be the subsequent proportion of 
officers who are promoted from a rank into the next rank. The ‘absorption’ state refers to 
separation. 
It is generally possible to determine a ‘steady state’ of the Markov model which is 
the situation where the number of personnel transitioning from one state to another is the 
same when comparing consecutive time periods t minus 1 to t. For example, a steady 
state for USMC officers might indicate that in any one year (t minus 1) the number of 
officers who transitioned from their first YOS into the second was 1200, which is the 
same number that transitioned from their first to second YOS in the following year (t), 
assuming accessions remain constant. When this occurs for all transitions then a steady 
state has been achieved. The value of obtaining an estimate for the steady state is that it 
provides the necessary information to predict the number of officers in each YOS when 
the accession number remains constant. In other words, given the number of accessions 
in each year (and assuming it remains constant), it is possible to determine the number in 
each YOS, and therefore approximate the number of officers in any rank. The existence 







The general form of the steady state for the Markov model is given by: 
1( ) ( )Ts t I P rλ −= −   (7) 
where 
( )s t  = ‘stock’ or number of personnel at time t in each state 
λ  = accessions (scalar) 
r = recruiting vector designating what proportion of λ  are recruited 
into each state (dimension 1 ×  k) 
I = Identity matrix (dimension k ×  k) 
PT = Transpose of the transition matrix P (dimension k ×  k) 
k = number of states in the transition matrix. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses propose the formation of two separate matrices, one each for prior 
enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers. The data are generally only available to permit 
construction of matrices based on YOS transitions. The hypotheses are interrelated and 
concern the development of the optimal mix of prior and non-prior enlisted officers. 
 
Hypothesis 2: the cost of a non-prior enlisted officer exceeds the cost of a prior-enlisted 
officer so that where budget is the only constraint prior enlisted officers are less costly. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: a point exists whereby an optimal mix of prior enlisted and non-prior 
enlisted officers can be obtained with respect to force structure and budget constraints. 
Hypothesis 3: prior enlisted officers, as the only accessions, cannot provide sufficient 






4. Hypothesized Effects 
It is expected that there are numerical values for the optimal number of prior and 
non-prior enlisted USMC officer accessions. The non-existence of such values would 
suggest that HQMC has the flexibility to access any number of non-prior or prior enlisted 
officers including none at all. 
The second hypothesis is thought to be true based simply on the average cost of a 
USNA graduate when compared to the costs of all other commissioning sources. As the 
majority of USMC officers from USNA are non-prior enlisted, then the contribution of 
the USNA officers to the average cost of non-prior enlisted officers is likely to be large in 
comparison to prior enlisted officers. 
The final hypothesis is more ambiguous in its likely effect. The results of Chapter 
V indicated that prior enlisted officers appear to have a better survival rate than their non-
prior enlisted counterparts. However, whether the difference is practically significant 
enough to suggest that non-prior enlisted officers could not maintain force structure by 
themselves, without changing promotion criteria or inducing bonuses, is uncertain.  
 
D. DATA 
Data for the non-parametric model were obtained from two sources, the Center 
for Naval Analysis (CNA) and the Defence Manpower Data Center (DMDC). In 
particular, two standard reports from the DMDC web site, the Officer Continuation 
Report and the Officer Inventory Report for 2000, were used. 
1. Active Duty Officer Continuation Report 
The Military Personnel Policy Active Duty Officer Continuation Report uses the 
DMDC active duty master files for officers (minus Coast Guard) from September 1988 
through the most recent fiscal year. The purpose of the report is to show the continuation 
rate for officers where a ‘continuation’ is defined by matching the beginning of the fiscal 






September 1988 and is also in September 1989 he or she is counted as a continuation for 
FY89.29 This process is repeated for each year. 
2. Officer End Strength Report 
The Military Personnel Policy Officer End Strength Report also uses the DMDC 
active duty master files for officers (minus Coast Guard) and provides information on the 
officer end strength, by rank, continuously from 1990 to 2002.30 
3. Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession Career 
The MCCOAC data file from CNA, which was the same file used for 
development of the Cox regression model, can also be used for the non-parametric 
model. The MCCOAC file is described in detail in Chapter IV, and provides information 
regarding the careers of the prior and non-prior enlisted officers not available from other 
sources.  
 
E. DATA LIMITATIONS 
Data limitations for the MCCOAC file were detailed in Chapter IV Part E and still 
apply for the non-parametric model. The DMDC data have several limitations which can 
be overcome, in part, through use of the MCCOAC file. In particular, the DMDC data set 
cannot be clearly divided into prior and non-prior enlisted officers. As a result, estimating 
survival characteristics for each group is not possible with the DMDC data alone. 
Regardless, the DMDC data provide easy access to information on the total numbers of 
officers across each rank and YOS.    
 
                                                 
29 Online source. The continuation rates are also available by gender, race and community and are 
displayed by service. 







F. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FISCAL CONSTRAINT 
The fiscal constraint on the numbers of prior and non-prior enlisted officers 
assumes that there is an implied total budget for officer accessions. Because of the variety 
of methods by which accessions can occur and the number of defense agencies involved 
in the accession process, there appears to be no single dollar amount allocated to a single 
authority for officer accessions. Instead, budgets are allocated to a variety of authorities 
within the Department of Navy for officer accessions. Despite this, it is assumed that the 
combined total of the average cost of each officer accession represents a close estimate of 
the total budget for officer accessions. 
  Together with the force structure constraint, described in Section G, the fiscal 
constraint provides one barrier which ensures the number of one type of officer, prior 
enlisted or non-prior enlisted, cannot exceed a certain level. To develop the fiscal 
constraint in isolation from the force structure constraint, it is necessary to first ignore the 
obvious impact of the force structure, and consider only the number of officers that can 
be ‘purchased’ given a particular budget. 
1. Cost of Officers 
The mix of officers, given a particular budget and without regard for the number 
of required officers, can be shown in Figure 3.  In the diagram, the point Z is the 
unknown theoretical optimum mix of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers, 
indicated by PE0 and NPE0 respectively. The accession budget is fixed hence prior 
enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers officer quantities can only change such that the 
total cost remains the same. 
The lines represented by Mk show possible mixes of officers, holding the budget 
constant. Note that all lines Mk are straight suggesting that only the average costs are 
used to construct the diagram. If marginal costs were used, it is possible that the curve 












In any case, the line M1 represents the special case where prior enlisted and non-
prior enlisted officers are perfect substitutes with respect to cost (cost PE = cost NPE). 
The slope of M1 is minus one, indicating that we can replace one prior enlisted officer 
with one non-prior enlisted officer on a one-to-one ratio. The points X and Y represent 
the theoretical situation where, using the allocated budget, all officer accessions are either 
prior enlisted only (Y) or non-prior enlisted only (X) and marginal costs are identical to 
average costs. In reality, it is doubtful that prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers 
are perfect substitutes. 
The line M2 shows a situation where non-prior enlisted officers are more 
expensive than prior enlisted officers. The slope of the line is closer to zero than M1 
which means the trade-off is not one-to-one and that to increase the number of non-prior 































Conversely, M3 shows the situation where prior enlisted officers are more 
expensive than non-prior enlisted officers. The slope is smaller than minus one which 
means that increasing the number of prior enlisted officers by one entails decreasing the 
number of non-prior enlisted officers by more than one. 
The lines M1, M2, and M3 all give straight-line explanations of the relationship 
between prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers, which is the case when the average 
costs are assumed. When marginal costs are calculated, V1 is likely to be closer to reality 
indicating that the relationship between the cost of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted 
officers, given a particular budget, is not constant over the range of possibilities. 
Figure 4 shows, in percentage terms, the prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted 
officers commissioned between 1986 and 1999. At this stage, it is not possible to 
ascertain which line more closely reflects reality. Current data, shown in Figure 4, show 
the number of prior enlisted officer accessions is approaching that of non-prior enlisted 
officer accessions and may give the impression that M1 is assumed by USMC officer 
accession planners. Of interest is the trend since 1986 which gives some suggestion that, 
assuming all else equal including accession budget, the USMC may be operating on M1 
where there is no apparent regard as to whether an officer was prior enlisted or not.  
Hypothesis 2 proposes that M3 would better reflect reality if non-prior enlisted officers 









































2. Costs and Benefits 
A general list of the costs and benefits of high levels of prior enlisted officer 
accessions are provided in Table 17. Many of the benefits are intangible and 
unquantifiable and others are problematic in their calculation. As a result, this thesis 
concentrates on the known costs of each commissioning source. As an example of a 
problematic calculation, high numbers of prior enlisted officer accessions may enable 
lower expenditure on officer recruiting and advertising activities; however, an ensuing 
increase in enlisted advertising may be required to obtain the necessary quality of 
enlistees to eventually become officers.  
 
Table 17.   Benefits of a High Proportion of Prior Enlisted Officer Accessions 
Benefits Costs 
  
Increase in experience and productivity Increased PCS cost moves 
Fewer recruiters for officers Increased recruiters for enlisted personnel 
Less officer advertising Increased enlisted personnel advertising 
Increased retention of enlisted personnel Reduced yrs of commissioned service of officers 
Reduced USNA costs Increased PLC, OCC, NROTC costs 









The data obtained for this thesis only enable the determination of the average cost 
per accession for each commissioning source, which is shown in Table 18, column (d). 
The cost of OCS is not included in the figures below as all officers attend OCS. 
Additionally, post-commissioning costs such as any necessary training and education 
costs required after commissioning are not included. 
Table 18 shows that the average cost for ECP and MCP officers is zero. This is 
because officers from these commissioning sources attend OCS directly. ECP officers 
already posses a degree, whereas MCP officers are commissioned without a degree, and 
hence no costs are associated with these commissioning sources. This thesis will not 
include the impact of post-commissioning costs; however, it is expected that inclusion of 
these costs may have an effect of the optimum level of officers. Additionally, marginal 
costs may be more relevant for this analysis where we are considering increasing or 
decreasing the number of prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted officers, not completely 
discontinuing using particular accession sources. As stated by Bernard and Mehay “… 
average cost is most relevant to the decision to open or close a program, whereas 


















(in 2003 $) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Otherb  21 51 - 
PLC 1330 5029 $21,600 
OCC 2874 1779 $21,600 
NROTC 282 3269 $53,600 
MECEPa 820 - $53,600 
ECPc 653 - $0 
USNA 83 1981 $229,200 
MCPd 205 - $0 
    
Total (n=18464) 6265 12109  
Source: figures for MCCOAC, OCC and PLC figures from MCRC. ROTC and 
USNA figures from Mehay and Bernard (2003). Missing data: 90 
 
3. The Fiscal Constraint 
The fiscal constraint itself is represented by the combination of prior enlisted or 
non-prior enlisted officers such that the total budget for officer accessions is not 
exceeded. The resulting equation is a straight line showing the relationship between prior 
and non-prior enlisted officers: 
 
Cost of NPE 
officer ($) ×  
NPE officer 
accessions +







                                                 
a aECP and MCP have no attributed costs because these personnel enter OCS directly without residential attendance on a 
commissioning course such as PLC, OCC, NROTC or USNA. MECEP costs are estimated as the same as NROTC as MECEP 
accessions are required to undertake a degree through NROTC. OCS and TBS costs are not included as these costs are approximately 
the same for each commissioning source except USNA graduates who do not attend OCS. 
b Average cost of ‘other’ assumed to be $0. 
c ECP officers already possess a degree, hence they are not required to undertake a program such as NROTC. These officers attend 
OCS/TBS directly. 
d MCP officers do not have a degree on commissioning however are expected to pursue one after commissioning. MCP officers may 







G. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE CONSTRAINT 
The force structure constraint assumes that there is a particular number of 
officers, at each rank, that cannot be exceeded. Together with the fiscal constraint 
described in Section F, the force structure constraint provides a second barrier that 
ensures that the combined number of prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted officers, cannot 
exceed a certain number. To develop the force structure constraint in isolation from the 
fiscal constraint, it is necessary to consider only the number of officer accessions required 
to maintain a particular force structure, without regard for their respective costs.  
Specification of the constraint on the mix of prior enlisted or non-prior enlisted 
officers in terms of force structure required the use of both the MCCOAC data file and 
standard reports available on the DMDC web site. The method used involves determining 
what mixes of officers would provide suitable quantities to maintain the officer force 
structure, that is, the mix of prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers required at the 
O-1 level to provide suitable numbers of O-4’s. 
1. Assumptions 
There are three critical assumptions in predicting force structure that simplify 
reality. The first is that selection criteria for promotion have not changed since 1986 and 
are not likely to change in the future. This assumption is necessary because, in reality, 
any shortage in ranks above O-4 could easily be controlled by relaxing promotion criteria 
(and vise versa). This paper requires selection criteria to remain constant such that, on 
average, the promotion pattern of officers in 2000 is the same as the promotion pattern 
from 1986 onwards. 
The second simplifying assumption is that all officers follow the same career 
pattern in terms of years spent at each rank. The assumption is that all officers, both prior 
enlisted or non-prior enlisted, spend two years as an O-1, two years as an O-2, six years 
as an O-3, and five years as an O-4. There is insufficient data to consider careers beyond 
O-4. This assumption only approximates reality, as prior enlisted officers can, and often 






and all officers can be promoted early, late, or even demoted. For the purpose of the 
model, restated below, all officers are ‘recruited’ into O-1 and at year one.31 
1( ) ( )Ts t I P rλ −= −  
The final simplifying assumption is that the loss patterns for officers have been 
generally the same since 1986.32 This again does not reflect reality as there are many 
external factors affecting retention including the state of the economy, and downsizing, to 
name just two. This assumption simplifies analysis as it permits the creation of an 
estimated ‘steady state’ force structure.  
The combined effects of the assumptions on the model is that the transition matrix 
P remains constant, r is a vector of (1,0,0,0,…,0) and therefore λ, the number of 
accessions, can be varied to maintain the force structure. 
2. Transition Matrices 
DMDC has provided a routine report on the continuation rates of officers by years 
of service continuously since 1990. This matrix, as detailed earlier, defines a 
‘continuation’ as a service member who was present in year t and in year t+1. The 
resulting percentages indicate all those personnel who had remained since the previous 
year. Unfortunately, the data do not permit separation into prior enlisted or non-prior 
enlisted officers so it is necessary to use the MCCOAC file detailed in Chapter IV. 
The MCCOAC data file provides sufficient information to determine the 
historical separation rates for prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers, by FY cohort 
since 1986.  It is possible, from this information, to develop a Years of Service (YOS) 
non-parametric transition model that indicates the probabilities of transition of an 
individual from one YOS to the next for each cohort from 1986 to 1999, for both prior 
and non-prior enlisted officers.  
                                                 
31 In the context of equation 7, this assumes the recruiting vector r consists of (1,0,0,0,….,0) so that all 
accessions enter the transition matrix at YOS =1. 






The data are severely limited for development of the transition matrices owing to 
the cohorts available for analysis. For example, the 1986 cohort data provide sufficient 
information to develop a transition matrix for 14 years (or typically to the end of O-4). 
Later cohorts, such as 1999, have only one year of data to determine transition 
probabilities. Therefore, between 1986 and 1999 there are 14 estimates for the transition 
from YOS 1 to YOS 2, but there is only one estimate (from the 1986 cohort) for the 
transition from YOS 14 to YOS 15. To construct a complete transition matrix, it is 
assumed in the absence of additional information, that the survival probabilities in the 
earlier years represented by the data provide an adequate estimate of successive survival 
probabilities where the information is not available. 
3. Force Structure Constraint 
When the separate transition matrices for prior and non-prior enlisted officers are 
used together, it is possible to determine how many officers would exist, in a steady state, 
if particular accession figures for prior and non-prior enlisted officers were used. For 
example, if 3000 O-4’s were required in steady state, it is possible to determine all 
combinations of prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions that would result in 3000 
O-4’s. In other words, the force structure constraint is the combination of prior and non-
prior enlisted officer accessions such that the number of officers required at a particular 
rank is obtained. The steady-state transition matrices are valuable as they allow the 
officer accession numbers for both prior and non-prior enlisted officers to be varied while 
keeping the officers required at a particular rank constant. The simple linear form of this 
constraint is: 
1δ  ×  NPE officer accessions + 2δ  ×
PE officer 
accessions =
Officers required at a 
particular rank 
(9) 
where 1δ  and 2δ  are coefficients which determine the slope of the force structure 
constraint resulting from the possible combinations of officers accessions required to 
obtain the prescribed number of O-4 officers. The coefficients can be easily obtained by 
setting one group of officers equal to zero, and determining the number of the remaining 







H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As detailed in the overview of this chapter, the methods used to obtain the 
optimum mix of officers, including the steady state transition matrix and the constraints, 
all make several simplifying assumptions that generalize the resulting model. For the 
fiscal constraint the assumptions include the requirements that the linear form of the 
constraint be approximately straight around the optimal value and that a value for the 
accession budget can be estimated. The force structure constraint makes the assumptions 
that selection criteria for promotion are constant, the number of years spent in each rank 
is the same for all officers, and that loss rates have been constant since 1986 and will 
continue at that level. 
The two constraints discussed in this chapter can, in theory, be applied to the APD 
in an attempt at determining their intersection if one exists. The intersection represents 
that point where the number of prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions provide for 






VII. MARKOV OPTIMIZATION OF ACCESSIONS 
A. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Although the theory behind each constraint can be difficult to explain, the 
application of theory in determining the algebraic form of the constraints is not 
particularly complex. The application of each constraint in determining the optimum, is 
also simpler than the explanation of the methodology. This chapter expands on the theory 
from Chapter VI to determine the algebraic form of the constraints and the subsequent 
optimum.  
The methodology discussed in Chapter VI was designed to determine the 
optimum number of prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions across the entire 
USMC. The method can also be considered for optimizing accession numbers within an 
occupation and within a commissioning source. The second half of this chapter discusses 
the use of the optimization approach when the data are separated into occupational 
groups and commissioning sources. 
1. Fiscal Constraint 
Equation (8) shown in Section F of Chapter VI specified the fiscal constraint. It is 
possible, using the average costs already presented, to determine the constant values in 
equation (8). Using the figures listed in Table Table 18.  and omitting the ‘other’ 
category, the remaining 6,265 prior enlisted officers (including those from MECEP, ECP 
and MCP) had an average cost of approximately $27,036 in 2003 dollars. The 12,109 
non-prior enlisted officers had an average cost of approximately $64,382 in 2003 
dollars.33  
Overall, the average cost per accession is $51,637. Since the average number of 
officer accessions since 1986 has been 1319 officers (449 prior enlisted and 870 non-
prior enlisted), this implies that the average ‘budget’ for officer accessions is 
approximately $68,150,420 (in 2003 dollars). This figure represents the fiscal constraint 
in that the total cost of officer accessions should not exceed $68,150,420. Substituting the 
                                                 
33 It is worth noting that the average cost per prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officer presented 






values obtained for the accession costs and total costs into equation (7), the straight-line 
equation for this constraint is approximated by: 
$64,382 ×  NPE + $27,036 ×  PE = $68,150,420 (budget)    (10) 
2. Force Structure Constraint 
By developing the transition matrices described in Section G of Chapter VI, it is 
possible to determine the constants 1δ  and 2δ shown in equation (9). Because it is not 
expected that the survival rates for prior and non-prior enlisted officers are the same, 1δ  
and 2δ  are also not expected to be the same.  
Figure 5 shows the survival rates for prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers 
from commissioning onwards using Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimates and gives an 
indication of the difference in the survival rates between the two groups. The diagram 
appears as stepwise because the data do not permit for accurate calculation of survival 
within a year; hence separations are all assumed to take place at the end of the year. 
Additionally, as expected, for the first three transitions the survival rate is close to one 
which reflects the restriction on separations until completion of an initial obligation 
period. The remainder of the diagram shows a gradual difference in the separation rates 
with prior enlisted officers showing a greater propensity for survival. The transition 
matrices derived from the KM estimates for prior and non-prior enlisted officers are 


























Prior Enlisted Non-prior enlisted
Source: Author. 
 
The predetermined number of officers required at any particular rank (left-hand 
side of equation (9)) can be varied according to information known to planners. Indeed 
one benefit of the model used for non-parametric optimization is the flexibility in 
determining the number of officers required at any rank. The KM estimates, however are 
determined from historical survival rates; hence the constants 1δ  and 2δ should not be 
varied.34 
The values chosen for the number of officers required at a given rank for the 
remainder of this thesis are based on the historical average of O-4’s from 1995 to 1999 
inclusive, or 3,280 officers. A sensitivity analysis will use other values which may be 
chosen to optimize the number of officer accessions. 
The constants 1δ  and 2δ are determined by initially setting either prior or non-
prior enlisted officer accessions in equation (9) to zero. Using the transition matrix for the 
remaining type of officer it is then possible to determine the number of accessions 
required for that officer type to obtain a predetermined number of officers at a certain 
                                                 
34 As further cohort data becomes available the KM estimates should be revised and adjustments to 






rank, say O-4. Determining the coefficient is then just a simple algebraic solution. The 
same process is repeated for the remaining officer type. For example: 
Step 1. Set one group of officers to zero and determine the number of officers 
required at O-4: 
 1δ  ×  NPE officer accessions + 2δ  ×
PE officer 
accessions =




⇒  1δ  ×  0 + 2δ  × PE officer accessions = 3,280  
 
Step 2. using the transition matrix for prior-enlisted officers, determine the 
number of accessions required to obtain 3280 O-4’s in the steady state. 
 
⇒      2δ  × 1115 = 3,280  
 
Step 3. Solving for 2δ : 2δ = 2.94. 
Step 4. Repeat the above steps setting the number of prior enlisted officers to 
zero. 
The final result of the force structure constraint, which is assumed to be a straight 
line near the optimum, can be applied to equation (9) and is approximated by:35 
2.627 ×  NPE + 2.941 ×  PE = 3,280 (O-4’s)     (12) 
 
                                                 






B. ACCESSION OPTIMIZATION FOR ALL COMMISSIONING SOURCES 
1. Optimization Results 
The intersection of the two constraint lines (equations (10) and (12)) indicates the 
point at which a force structure necessary to obtain 3,280 O-4’s can be achieved within  
the assigned budget. Note that it is possible within the construct of this model to obtain a 
force structure with 3,280 O-4’s for less than the assigned budget; however, this was not 
the goal. 
Solving for prior and non-prior enlisted officer accessions gives the optimum 
number as: 
Optimum prior enlisted officer accessions  = 272 (22.4%) 
Optimum non-prior enlisted officers accessions =  944 (77.6%) 
Total officers      =  1216 (100%) 
 
The total value is just 49 officers below the estimated requirement of 1,265 for 
2003 and just 11 officers above the 2003-2006 average of 1,205 provided by HQMC. The 
mix however, is different from recent trends which indicate the actual ratio of prior to 
non-prior enlisted officer accessions is closer to 1:1 (see Figure 4.  ). 
2. Sensitivity Analysis 
There are two ways to conduct a sensitivity analysis of the results. The first is to 
use a 95 percent confidence interval of the KM estimates and apply this to the force 
structure constraint. The second is to conclude that the figures used in calculating the 
fiscal constraint may not be entirely correct, and the figure used for the number of O-4’s 
required may not be correct. 
Using the second method, sensitivity regions can be determined for each of the 
constraints. In reality, the fiscal constraint may vary from that calculated earlier in this 
thesis by plus or minus ten percent; and the force structure constraint may be better 
calculated by using the average number of O-4’s from 1990-1999 or just the raw number 
in the most recent year, 1999, rather than the average over 1995-1999. By changing the 
figures used for the force structure constraint it is possible to obtain upper and lower 






2.627 ×  NPE + 2.941×  PE = 3,400 (number of O-4’s in 1999 only) 
2.627 ×  NPE + 2.941×  PE = 3,180 (average number of O-4’s from 1990-1999) 
Note that the constants have remained the same. This occurs because the 
transition matrices, which determine the constants, have remained unchanged. 
Figure 6 shows the application of the above two equations and a ten percent 
margin of error on the individual calculations of the average cost of each commissioning 
source (the total fiscal constraint of approximately $68 million remains constant). The 
result is the region ABDC showing the optimization results as a range of values for prior 
and non-prior enlisted officer accessions. 
 














































The table below indicates the coordinates for the corners of the resulting region of 
possible optimum solutions with the center point (optimum) located at coordinates (272, 
944). 
 
Table 19.   Optimization Sensitivity Results 
Point PE NPE TOTAL 
A 48 1156 1204 
B 169 1105 1274 
C 354 814 1168 
D 475 763 1238 
Optimum 272 944 1216 
Source: Author. All figures have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
 
3. Summary of Optimization for All Commissioning Sources 
Using the sensitivity analysis and equations (10) and (11), the optimal values for 
prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted officer accessions is estimated to be approximately 
272 and 944, respectively. As indicated in Table 19, the value for prior enlisted could 
vary from approximately 48 to 475 and non-prior enlisted could vary from 763 to 1,156 
within the boundaries indicated in Figure 6.    
As noted previously, the relationship between prior and non-prior enlisted officer 
accessions is assumed to be a straight line around the optimum. However, it is likely that 
the farther from the optimum the less likely the relationship will remain linear as 
described in the earlier equations and figures. This thesis does not assume that equations 
(10) and (12) can be extrapolated toward the axis for a meaningful result because it is 
suspected that the relationship does not maintain a straight line. This is likely to be true 







C. ACCESSION OPTIMIZATION BY OCCUPATION 
Using the same methodology, it is also possible to optimize accessions within the 
three general occupational fields. In order to achieve this it is necessary to know the 
requirement for officers within each occupational field at the O-4 rank. DMDC data 
indicates that there were 3,280 O-4’s from 1995-1999 and the MCCOAC data indicates 
that 28.65 percent were in combat-related occupations, 46.70 percent in combat support-
related occupations, and 24.65 percent were in combat service support-related 
occupations in 1999. Using the MCCOAC percentages, of the 3,280 O-4’s, 940 were in 
combat, 1,532 were in combat support, and 809 in combat service support. These figures 
represent the ‘goals’ for each of the three optimizations.  
1. Optimization for Combat Officers 
Figure 7 shows the survival diagram based on KM estimates for prior and non-
prior enlisted officers in combat-related occupations. As with the overall optimization, 
Figure 7 provides evidence of a difference between the officer types. 
 




























The implied accession budget for combat-related officers is $20,833,519 and the 
constants in fiscal constraint remain the same, hence the fiscal constraint is given by: 
 $64,382 ×  NPE + $27,036 ×  PE = $20,833,519 (budget)    (13) 
The force structure constraint is determined in the same manner as the overall 
optimum. The constants have changed very little when compared with equation (12) 
indicating the similarity in the relationship between the combat occupations and the 
overall occupations. 
2.521 ×  NPE + 2.910 ×  PE = 940 (O-4 combat officers)   (14) 
The resulting optimum, shown diagrammatically in Figure 8, is 295 non-prior 
enlisted officers and 67 prior enlisted officers. Table 20 shows the sensitivity analysis 
using the same sensitivity criteria as detailed earlier. The number of prior enlisted 
officers, according to the sensitivity analysis, is between two and 126 while the range for 
non-prior enlisted officers is 241 to 359. 
 
Figure 8.   Sensitivity Diagram for the Optimization of Combat-Related Prior and Non-














































Table 20.   Optimization Sensitivity Results for Combat Occupations 
 
Point PE NPE TOTAL 
A 2 359 361 
B 37 344 381 
C 91 256 347 
D 126 241 367 
Optimum 67 295 362 
Source: Author. 
 
2. Optimization for Combat Support Officers 
Figure 9 shows the survival diagram for prior and non-prior enlisted officers in 
combat support-related occupations. Unlike the combat officers, the difference is less 
obvious and is only noticeable from nine YCS. Again, there is visual evidence of a 
difference between prior and non-prior enlisted officers in terms of their survival rates. 
 




























The implied accession budget for combat support officers is $26,223,044 and as 
with previous optimizations, the constants in the fiscal constraint remain the same. Hence 
the fiscal constraint is given by: 
 $64,382 ×  NPE + $27,036 ×  PE = $26,223,044  (budget)    (15) 
The constants, 1δ  and 2δ , in the force structure constraint are very similar (0.027 
differences) implying that, in terms of the survival rate, prior and non-prior enlisted 
officers are close to perfect substitutes. 
2.939 ×  NPE + 2.912 ×  PE = 1532 (O-4 combat support officers)  (16) 
The resulting optimum, shown diagrammatically in Figure 10, is 323 non-prior 
enlisted officers and 200 prior enlisted officers. Table 21 shows the sensitivity analysis 
using the same sensitivity criteria as detailed earlier. The number of prior enlisted 
officers, according to the sensitivity analysis, is between 92 and 297 while the range for 
non-prior enlisted officers is 245 to 414. 
 
Figure 10.   Sensitivity Diagram for the Optimization of Combat Support-Related Prior 








































Table 21.   Optimization Sensitivity Results for Combat Support Occupations 
 
Point PE NPE TOTAL 
A 92 414 506 
B 153 388 541 
C 236 271 507 
D 297 245 543 
Optimum 200 323 523 
Source: Author. 
 
3. Optimization for Combat Service Support Officers 
Figure 11 shows the survival diagram for prior and non-prior enlisted officers in 
combat service support-related occupations. The survival curves are not unlike those 
exhibited by the combat officers. 
 





























The implied accession budget for combat support officers is $21,110,293 and as 
with previous optimizations, the constants in the fiscal constraint remain the same. Hence 
the fiscal constraint is given by: 
 $64,382 ×  NPE + $27,036 ×  PE = $21,110,293 (budget)    (17) 
The differences between the constants, 1δ  and 2δ , in the force structure 
constraints is somewhat larger than those for combat and combat support officers. This 
relatively large difference implies that the behavior of prior and non-prior enlisted 
combat service support officers is considerably different from members of the other two 
groups. Furthermore, the relatively large coefficient for prior enlisted officers is likely to 
reduce the optimal number of prior enlisted combat service support officer accessions. 
2.409 ×  NPE + 3.574 ×  PE = 809 (O-4 combat support officers)  (18) 
The resulting optimum, shown in Figure 12, is 324 non-prior enlisted officers and 
10 prior enlisted officers. Table 22 shows the sensitivity analysis using the same 
sensitivity criteria as detailed earlier. The sensitivity analysis for the CSS officers 
provides two points, A and B, which are not feasible owing to the negative numbers, and 
an area in the sensitivity region to the right of zero prior enlisted officers where the 
solutions are also unrealistic, represented by the shaded area. In this optimization, only 
the results to the right of zero prior enlisted officers can be considered realistic. The 
optimization results suggest that prior enlisted officer accession figures should be kept to 







Figure 12.   Sensitivity Diagram for the Optimization of Combat Service Support-Related 




















Table 22.   Optimization Sensitivity Results for Combat Service Support Occupations 
 
Point PE NPE TOTAL 
A -50 385 - 
B -21 373 - 
C 35 283 318 
D 63 271 334 







































4. Summary of Optimization by Occupation 
When the optimum results for each occupation are summed together, the result is 
very close to the overall result detailed in Section B, including the sensitivity analyses. 
This is not particularly surprising as the occupation optimizations arise from the 
disaggregation of the data used in the overall optimization.  
 
Table 23.   Optimization Summary by Occupation 
 
Occupation PE NPE TOTAL 
Combat 67 295 362 
Combat Support 200 323 523 
Combat Service Support 10 324 334 
    
Total 277 942 1219 
Source: Author. 
 
The optimizations for each occupation show that although an overall result can be 
obtained, the ratio of prior enlisted to non-prior enlisted cannot be generalized across 
each occupation. This is also likely to be true if the data were further divided by MOS. 
However, because the KM estimates require significant amounts of data, the sample 
could not be separated into MOS groups while maintaining integrity in the KM estimates. 
Regardless, the optimizations give an indication that the values for prior and non-
prior enlisted officers vary significantly across occupations. In terms of the two 
constraints, there is evidence to suggest that prior enlisted officers may not benefit CSS-
related occupations when compared with combat and CS occupations. However, 
significant numbers of prior enlisted officers in the combat and CS-related occupations 






D. ACCESSION OPTIMIZATION BY COMMISSIONING SOURCE 
Ideally, an additional subdivision of the optimization problem by commissioning 
source, may also be useful. However, at least three serious problems can be encountered 
when attempting this optimization. 
As discussed previously, in order to optimize the number of prior and non-prior 
enlisted officers it is necessary to know what the ‘goal’ is. Commissioning source is not 
considered a criterion for promotion and, as a result, there exists no quota of O-4’s which 
must come from any given commissioning source. This means there is no goal for a 
particular number of officers at any given rank from any given commissioning source. It 
is possible to make assumptions based on how many of the O-4’s in 1999 originated from 
a particular commissioning source; however, the results probably cannot be generalized 
for a particular commissioning source across several cohorts.  
An additional problem arises when the slopes of the two constraints are not 
sufficiently different to permit the determination of an optimum value. The average costs 
for prior and non-prior enlisted officers within each commissioning source are the same, 
hence the slope of the fiscal constraint on the APD is exactly negative one. Furthermore, 
if the survival rates for prior and non-prior enlisted officers within a commissioning 
source are not sufficiently different, then 1δ  and 2δ  will be very similar and the result 
will be two lines that are almost parallel. Even if the two constraint lines eventually 
intersected, any sensitivity analysis would result in a large range of possible solutions. 
A final problem occurs when, in dividing the sample by commissioning source, 
the resulting sample size is reduced to levels where the KM estimates are not reliable. 
The overall optimization discussed in Sections A and B, and the optimization by 
occupations discussed in Section C, benefit from aggregation. However, some 
commissioning sources are too small in their own right to enable particularly robust KM 
estimates, and therefore the force structure constraints may not be accurate. 
Nevertheless, for those commissioning sources with participation from both prior 
and non-prior enlisted officers, it is possible to conduct the same calculations and obtain 






provide a suitable number of both prior and non-prior enlisted officers to allow 
reasonable KM estimates. As the calculations follow exactly the method used so far, and 
some of the problems discussed above are encountered, only an optimization for PLC is 
discussed.  
1. Example of an Optimization by Commissioning Source  
In 1999, 35.43 percent of currently serving O-4 officers were commissioned 
through PLC. If the total number of O-4’s required is 3,280, then it follows that 1162 O-
4’s should originate from PLC. This figure can be used to establish the force structure 
constraint as was done previously. Calculation of the constants provides the following 
equation. 
2.558 ×  NPE + 2.944 ×  PE = 809 (O-4 officers from PLC in 1999) (19) 
The fiscal constraint is dependent only on the implied accession budget for PLC. 
There are, on average, 454 accessions through PLC, at an average cost in 2003 dollars of 
$21,600, for a total implied accession budget of approximately $9.8 million. In the 
economic sense, the two types of officers are perfect substitutes and the slope of the fiscal 
constraint is exactly negative one and must pass through 454 on both the prior and non-
prior enlisted axis. 







































The result, shown diagrammatically in Figure 13, illustrates the problem caused 
when the difference in the slopes is not great enough to obtain a meaningful optimal 
solution. Creation of a sensitivity region as was done in earlier section would result in a 
very large area which would consequently give almost useless results. Furthermore, the 
intercept implies that all accessions through this particular commissioning source should 
be non-prior enlisted, a solution which does not make much practical sense.  
One method that may be used to determine a solution and minimize some of the 
problems is to differentiate further between the costs of prior and non-prior enlisted 
officers from the same commissioning source. This is not possible using average costs; 
however, it can be done using either marginal costs or a costs/benefits analysis similar to 
that detailed earlier in Table 17.   
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
By using the constraints on accession numbers presented by the force structure, as 
defined by the number of O-4 officers required at steady state, and the budget as 
calculated by the average cost of commissioning sources, it is possible to determine 
optimum results for the numbers of prior and non-prior enlisted USMC officer 
accessions. Overall, the optimum number of prior and non-prior enlisted officer 
accessions is 272 and 944 accessions respectively.  
The model can also be used to optimize across occupational categories. It was 
found that prior enlisted officers in combat support-related occupations should contribute 
more toward maintaining the force structure than they do in combat service support-
related occupations. In combat service support occupations, the calculations indicate that 
very few prior enlisted officers are required to maintain the force structure.  
Unfortunately, the model is not suitable for optimization where the linear form of 
one constraint is similar to the linear form of the other, such that the constraints are 
almost parallel. In this situation the calculation of optimal figures may be subject to 
increased margins of error. Additionally, when the amount of data used to determine the 
KM estimates becomes small, as occurs during disaggregation of the data, the model is 






There are also several conditions on the constraints which have already been 
highlighted several times. Firstly, the constraints cannot be extrapolated toward both axes 
as the relationship between prior and non-prior enlisted officers is most likely not linear 
over the entire range of possibilities. Secondly, the assumption of a straight line for the 
budget constraint is a simplifying assumption resulting from the lack of information 


































VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The results obtained from the semi-parametric Cox regression and the non-
parametric optimization can provide decision makers with the quantitative information 
necessary to assist with decisions in regard to accession numbers. This chapter 
summarizes the results of the models used in this thesis and provides recommendations 
and topics for further study.  
1. Semi-parametric Model Results Summary 
The Cox Regression Method identified those characteristics of officers that affect 
their survival rates relative to a base case. It was found that prior enlisted officers had a 
slightly better survival rate, experiencing 93.8 percent of the hazard of non-prior enlisted 
officers. This result indicates that, with all other factors being equal, prior enlisted 
officers will leave the USMC at a slower rate than their non-prior enlisted counterparts. 
Other significant results showed that only officers from MECEP had a lower 
hazard than USNA, whereas PLC, OCC, NROTC and ECP all had decreased survival 
rates in comparison to USNA. Commissioning age was found to have a small but 
significant effect on survival with the hazard decreasing by 3.34 percent for every 
additional year of age at commissioning. Additionally, marital status had a large 
significant effect on survival; married officers experienced a hazard just 41.2 percent of 
that of non-married officers.  
The effects of age and marital status reflect the economic theory of the labor 
market. The positive effect due to age may be attributed to the increased possibility of a 
successful job match as an individual grows older. In other words, the older an individual 
gets the more likely he or she is to know what he or she wishes to do. The positive effect 
of marital status is reflected in all reviewed military and civilian literature and is likely a 
result of the desire of a married individual for financial stability.  
The officer’s occupation was also found to yield a significant and unexpected 
result. Officers in both combat and combat service support-related occupations were 






combat support-related officers. The reasons for the different hazard rates are uncertain 
and should be subject to further research. It is possible that combat service support skills 
are more readily transferable to civilian occupations. The same reason, transferability of 
skills, is probably not a factor in the earlier separation of combat occupations although 
operational tempo, posting localities, and family pressures may play a greater role in the 
decisions of combat officers.  
Finally, class standing was found to yield a significant result. Those officers 
graduating in the top third of their TBS class had a hazard 86 percent of those in the 
middle third and those in the bottom third had a hazard of 124 percent compared with the 
middle third. This may reflect a relationship between TBS class standing and a successful 
job match, or alternatively, those with lower TBS class standing may self-select out of the 
USMC.   
Neither gender nor ethnicity was found to be significant. All else being equal, a 
female is no more or less likely to survive than a male and there was no ethnicity that had 
a hazard larger or smaller than those officers classified as white. The significance of 
ethnicity and gender has varied in earlier studies; however, where they are found to be 
significant they are rarely practically significant. 
2. Non-parametric Model Results Summary 
The non-parametric model indicates that optimum numbers for prior and non-
prior enlisted officer accessions can be obtained using the two constraints of force 
structure and allocated budget. However, when the data are subdivided, the sample size 
becomes too small for accurate Kaplan-Meier estimates. Additionally, the subdivision of 
data by commissioning source does not allow all the variables in the model to be present 
and, as a result, the model fails or becomes questionable.  
The results of the non-parametric model indicate that the optimum number of 
prior enlisted officer accessions is 272 (22.4 percent) and the optimum number of non-
prior enlisted officer accessions is 944 (77.6 percent) for a total of 1,216 officer 
accessions annually.  These figures differ significantly when compared to recent trends in 
which the number of prior enlisted officers to non-prior enlisted officers was 53.4 and 






The large difference between the optimum and the current trend may have several 
consequences which will not be observed for at least another five years. Overall, the 
survival rates of officers are likely to increase. This has the secondary impact on 
increasing the number of officers available for promotion at any rank. If promotion is 
based only on the billets available, and not on time in rank, then there will be more 
officers available for promotion than required which may result in increases in time-in-
rank, competitiveness for promotion, and ultimately forced separations to maintain end-
strength. 
The optimum number of officer accessions with respect to prior or non-prior 
enlisted officers differed significantly across the three identified occupational categories 
of combat, combat support, or combat service support. The optimum for prior and non-
prior enlisted officers in combat-related occupations was 67 (18.5 percent) and 295 
(81.5%) respectively. The optimum for combat support-related occupations was 200 
(38.2 percent) and 323 (61.8 percent). And finally, the optimum for combat service 
support-related occupations was 10 (3 percent) and 324 (97 percent). 
The relatively low optimal number of prior enlisted officers for combat and 
combat service support-related occupations reflects the high separation rates for officers 
in these occupations. Higher numbers of prior enlisted officers would result in an increase 
in officers available for promotion and too many O-4’s. However, potential cost savings 
exist where non-prior enlisted accessions are replaced with the less expensive prior 
enlisted accessions and the overall number of accessions can be reduced. This would 








1. Accession Policy Review 
Based on the results of this thesis, there is evidence to suggest that the trend 
observed in officer accessions in the most recent years of the data may not represent the 
most useful allocation of given resources. Assuming full expenditure of the allocated 
funds for accession is desired, the current accessions of prior enlisted officers may be too 
high which will result in too many officers at the O-4 level. The model indicates that it is 
possible to reduce the accession budget and maintain the force structure by changing the 
numbers of prior and non-prior enlisted officers. 
It is recommended that the ratio of accessions for prior and non-prior enlisted 
officers be further reviewed with the view to reducing prior enlisted officer accessions, 
particularly to combat and combat service support occupations. It should be recognized 
that although high retention rates are normally considered desirable they may also result 
in forced attrition, increased time-in-rank for promotion, and ageing of the force. 
Subsequently a balance should be obtained such that attrition rates are sustainable. 
Dramatically increasing or decreasing accessions through any of the commissioning 
sources is not recommended however MECEP and USNA have higher retention rates 
than other commissioning sources. 
2. Cox Regression Methods 
Many quantitative studies of USMC manpower have used logit and ordinary least 
squares methods for analysis of data. Although these methods may be appropriate 
depending on the research topic, where the topic concerns survival rates and uses 
censored data, Cox regression methods should be considered.  
When logit models are used with censored data they often exclude valuable 
information arising from the duration of the ‘survival’, opting instead to code the 
information in a binary manner. Ordinary Least Squares is an entirely inappropriate 
method for analysis of censored data owing to its inability to deal with limited dependent 
variables or censored data. In contrast, the Cox regression method is specifically designed 







C. FUTURE STUDY 
1. Performance of Prior Enlisted Officers 
This thesis has not considered the relative performance of prior and non-prior 
enlisted officers and has instead assumed their performance to be approximately equal. 
Performance is often best measured by the promotion of an individual and the scores 
obtained on performance reports. The data available for this study only allowed the 
observation of an individual up to the rank of O-4 where promotions are largely (although 
not exclusively) automatic. Beyond O-4, promotions become more competitive and it 
may be possible to observe performance. The data necessary to observe performance 
accurately would need to trace officers beyond 15 years and preferably to the rank of O-6 
or higher. If data were available, such as performance report data, then a comparison of 
the performance of prior enlisted officers would complement the results of this thesis. 
2. Recalculation of Accession Costs with Respect to Marginal Costs 
As stated earlier, a major limitation for the optimization of prior and non-prior 
enlisted officer accessions was the inability to determine marginal costs for accessions for 
each of the commissioning sources. It is likely that the use of marginal costs would 
change the linear relationship of variables by the allocation of some secondary costs 
which are not captured using the average cost for each commissioning source. However, 
where the optimum can be obtained by the fiscal and force structure constraints, similar 
methodology to that used in this thesis can be considered. Further research could 
therefore consider accession optimization using marginal costs of officer accessions.  
3. Analysis Using Additional Cohorts 
The determination of the optimum number of prior and non-prior enlisted officer 
accessions relied heavily on the Kaplan-Meier estimates to determine the force structure 
constraint. The Kaplan-Meier estimates used in this thesis relied upon only a few 
observations of the survival rates, so as further data become available the recalculation of 
the survival rates would allow better Kaplan-Meier estimates and, subsequently, a more 
accurate force structure constraint. The use of additional cohorts or the availability of 
additional data for the cohorts used in this thesis would also permit a recalculation of the 






4. Difference Between Occupations 
This thesis identified a difference in the survival rates and optimum number of 
prior and non-prior enlisted officers between each of the three broad occupation 
categories; combat, combat support, and combat service support. Due to the number of 
MOS categories, significant amounts of data would be required to conduct this same 
study using individual MOS as a variable (rather than the three occupation categories); 
however, focused research may be possible on several of the larger MOS groups. The 
reasons for the very large difference in survival rates between the occupations are not 
clear and should be subjected to further analysis. A study of the factors that impact the 
separation decisions of officers with respect to their MOS may also reveal the reasons for 
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APPENDIX B. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR NON-PRIOR 
ENLISTED OFFICERS 
Year Group
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